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The purpose of this thesis is to answer the following set of interrelated research 
questions: do diasporas influence the foreign policy agendas of their host 
countries regarding their home countries? If so, when do they do it and how do 
they do it? In this thesis, I develop a primary explanation and an alternative 
explanation to test against the evidence I find in my case studies to determine 
which explanation is the more compelling explanation for the research questions 
posed. My primary explanation is that host country foreign policymakers are 
likely to place a diaspora’s home country policy issue onto the host country 
foreign policy agenda as a result of a diaspora’s electoral influence. My 
alternative explanation is that host country foreign policymakers are likely to 
place a diaspora’s home country policy issue onto the host country’s foreign 
policy agenda if the diaspora effectively frames the issue in ways that engage and 
appeal to policymakers. As case studies, I focus on the Sri Lankan Tamil 
diasporas in Britain and in Canada, and their respective roles in influencing the 
foreign policy agendas of Britain and Canada regarding the Sri Lankan civil war. 
After testing the explanations against the evidence in the case studies, I determine 
that the more compelling explanation is that diasporas influence the foreign policy 
agendas of their host countries regarding their home countries when they 
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The research question being posed in this thesis is threefold: do diasporas influence 
the foreign policy agendas, or the groups of issues to which policymakers in the 
diaspora’s host country are paying some serious attention at any given time, regarding 
their “home countries,” or countries of origin? If so, when do they do it and how do 
they do it? My interest in this query was sparked because while there exists a 
considerable literature on diasporas and policymaking, I wanted to undertake a project 
that adds to the literature on the subject of diasporas and their influence more 
specifically on foreign policymaking in their host states.  
To do so, in this thesis I develop and test a primary explanation and an 
alternative explanation in order to survey if, when and how a diaspora can influence 
the foreign policy agenda of its host country with regard a home country policy issue. 
The primary explanation I test is that host country foreign policymakers (intervening 
variable) are likely to place a diaspora’s home country policy issue onto the host-
country foreign policy agenda (dependent variable) as a result of a diaspora’s electoral 
influence (independent variable).  The alternative explanation I test is that host 
country foreign policymakers (intervening variable) are likely to place a diaspora’s 
home country policy issue onto the host country’s foreign policy agenda (dependent 
variable) if the diaspora effectively frames the issue in ways that engage and appeal to 
policymakers (independent variable). 
As case studies, I focus on the Sri Lankan Tamil diasporas in Britain and in 
Canada, and their respective roles in influencing the foreign policy agendas of Britain 
and Canada regarding the civil war in Sri Lanka1 which saw a bloody battle fought for 
                                                 
1 See Appendix 1 for a map of Sri Lanka as well as a figure indicating its location on the world map.  
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more than a quarter century between the Sri Lankan government and a group claiming 
to represent the country’s minority Tamil population called the Liberation Tigers of 
Tamil Eelam (also known as the Tamil Tigers or LTTE). The conflict cost as many as 
100,000 lives and prompted nearly one-quarter of the country’s Tamil population to 
flee the country, creating a world-wide diaspora of more than one million people 
(International Crisis Group 2010, 1-2), nearly half of whom were hosted in Britain 
and in Canada by the end of the war (Human Rights Watch 2006, 10).  
I chose these case studies because they appear to be likely cases for the 
alternative explanation and thus crucial cases to test against the primary argument. I 
have set up the project in this way because if the primary explanation can be shown to 
be the more compelling explanation when conditions are less favourable, I will be 
able to deduce that it is likely to be a compelling explanation in more favourable 
circumstances as well. In turn, I expect to find sufficient evidence in my case studies 
to suggest that the issue of the Sri Lankan war was reflected in each country’s foreign 
policy agenda and that the diasporas effectively framed the issue in ways that engaged 
and appealed to policymakers.  
My research for this project is based in evidence gathered in large part from 
personal correspondence and interviews with relevant policymakers and different Sri 
Lankan Tamil immigrants to the UK and Canada. I also conducted extensive archival 
research of pubic documents and publications such as speeches, websites, reports, 
parliamentary transcripts, newspaper clippings and academic books and journal 
articles.  
The thesis is organized into four subsequent chapters that explain in greater 
depth my project: the Literature Review, the Explanations and Research Design; the 
Case Studies: Evidence and Analysis; and; Final Conclusions. My Literature Review 
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chapter is where I build and justify the alternative explanation I am testing in this 
project. In it, I review the body of academic writings pertinent to my thesis topic 
which centre on writings on diasporas and social movement literature. I examine and 
explain how they attend to my area of study, where they do and do not provide 
satisfactory answers to my research subject, and where gaps can be filled by this 
project. The Explanations and Research Design chapter is divided into four key 
sections which each respectively explain in greater depth: pertinent definitions; the 
scope of my project; the primary and alternative explanations I am testing along with 
the indicators for each explanation; and my case selection and research method.  
The Case Studies chapter begins by describing and analysing findings around 
the relevant history and evolution of the civil war in Sri Lanka. Next I examine the 
contexts in Britain and in Canada with regard to the Sri Lankan Tamil communities in 
each country and each country’s foreign policy agenda regarding the Sri Lankan 
conflict. I then weigh each case study against the primary argument and the 
alternative argument. 
In my Final Conclusions chapter, I review my findings and discuss which 
explanation is more compelling given the evidence and the analysis I concluded in the 
previous chapter and I assess my confidence in the findings.  I also assess the 
contributions the thesis makes to literature that pertains to diasporas and their impact 






The purpose of this chapter is to synthesize and critique established literatures that are 
relevant to my subject matter and to compare and situate them with my thesis topic. It 
is in this chapter that I build and justify the alternative explanation I am testing in this 
project. I begin by positioning my project in the context of works that focus on 
diasporas as political actors. I then look at different literatures on social movements 
which are found largely within works from the field of political sociology. 
Throughout the chapter my chief aims are to explain the dialogue taking place within 
and across the pertinent writings in terms of how they relate to my subject matter, 
how I can employ them to address the central research question of this thesis, and 
where they succeed and where they fail in providing satisfactory answers to my 
research subject.  
 
2.1 Diasporas as Political Actors 
Originally, the term diaspora developed in the context of the exile of the Jews from 
their historic homeland to other states all over the world, and it in turn has the 
connotation in some literatures, particularly in earlier writings, of persecuted peoples 
who have been exiled involuntarily (Ostergaard-Nielson 2001a, 220). However, over 
time the term has come to be used more broadly by some scholars to describe 
populations dispersed for many different reasons, as the debate on what can be 
defined as an ‘involuntary reason’ has evolved, to include reasons beyond political 
victimization toward both push and pull factors, such as economic, educational and 
even environmental motivations (see Cohen 1997). 
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Thanks to the advancement and proliferation of new transportation and 
communications technologies around the world, immigrant groups who have in the 
past been more or less isolated in their new host countries now have increased 
abilities to maintain ties and keep up to date with events taking place in the home 
country. This has led to what some scholars have called a ‘diasporization’ of some 
groups (Saffran 1991; Weiner 1986). As groups of people are more and more able to 
remain connected through travel and through communication, their mental and 
psychological connections to their homelands can remain strong and grow if they are 
motivated to remain connected. However, while today’s diasporas have left their 
homelands for a variety of reasons, and while communications and other technologies 
have helped to facilitate their continued links to the homeland, the most critical aspect 
to highlight of what differentiates a diaspora from an immigrant community more 
broadly is a strong sense of identity that is tied to the homeland, based on a sensitive 
psychological and emotional connection felt toward the homeland.  
Unlike the different factors that motivate other non-state actors such as 
material gain or altruistic concerns that influence and determine interests (Jepperson, 
Wendt, and Katzenstein 1996, 60), identity is the interest for the diaspora. In other 
words, as Shain and Barth (2003) suggest, “The people's identity is not the starting 
point to be captured in order to influence interests, practices, and policies; identity is 
both the starting and the end point” (455). This is to say that the primary concern of 
diasporas is to maintain and enhance their historical and cultural identities, through 
which their self-esteem and autonomy can thrive (Rosenau 1993, xvi). For this reason, 
diasporas do not just strongly emphasize their group’s identity; they are differentiated 
by a refusal to totally assimilate into the host society and by a tendency toward feeling 
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obligated to the home society to uphold that sense of identity (Cohen 1997, 23-26; 
Adamson and Demetriou 2007).   
The scholarship on what motivates a diaspora to materialize is rather well-
developed: identity explains the relevant membership of the diaspora. In turn, the 
literature suggests that political activity for the diaspora would be engaging in what it 
perceives to be a conflict over the core of its identity. As Adamson and Demetriou 
(2007, 498) claim, the term diaspora is a prescriptive term in that it suggests that there 
are organizational forms and strategies which can be taken up as a means of 
constructing identity in ways that move beyond innocuous categories of immigrant, 
and which encourage identifications and forms of coalition-building and political 
action (for similar claims, also see: Clifford 1994; Gilroy 1993; Hall 1990). However, 
across the literature, it is not clearly explained what this activity looks like and 
specifically, how diasporas conduct this activity inside their host countries. Sheffer 
(2003) for instance says that it involves showing solidarity with their group in all 
different social spheres, including the political (9). His work implies that the identity 
variable would explain the goals of the group, its strategies, and even its resources for 
political action, but these implications are not addressed, not teased out methodically, 
and not tested. To my knowledge, such work has yet to be undertaken academically. 
Instead, the significant writings about diasporic political activity by and large centre 
on the transnational nature of diasporic politics, and concentrate on the links these 
groups have with their countries of origin rather than on their impact in the host 
country, or they focus on the unique American experience with ethnic lobbying. 
Hockenos (2003) for example looks at the role of “exile groups” from the 
former Yugoslavia, but the spotlight in the study is in the former Yugoslavia in their 
bearing on the conflicts there, and the implications of how they directly exported their 
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political agendas back into their native homelands. Wayland (2004) and Shain and 
Barth (2003) also both focus on the transnational nature of the diaspora and the 
impact it has in the home country. Wayland (2004) in particular focuses on the 
impacts of diasporas in the home country by examining the conditions in Sri Lanka 
and how the Tamil diaspora in Canada and elsewhere directly influenced the war in 
Sri Lanka. Shain and Barth (2003) survey the various roles diasporas take on in 
international relations, with the aim of synthesizing IR theory generally in order to 
explain the broad role of the diasporic actor, and they suggest that despite their 
international location, diasporas expand the meaning of the term ‘domestic politics’ to 
include politics not just inside the state but inside the people. However the domestic 
politics to which they refer are those of the home country, not the host country. A 
concentrated examination of activities and impacts of diasporas in their host countries 
is beyond its scope.  
There is also a significant body of writings that explore the American ethnic 
lobby experience, but they generally serve more as a comment on the American 
system and its implications for America, rather than advance our broader 
understanding of diasporas and their impact in foreign policymaking. Huntington 
(1997) for example looks at the erosion of the American national identity based on the 
growth of multiculturalist ideologies in America, and how this has, in his view, 
affected American politics in a negative fashion. Tucker, Keely and Wrigley (1990) 
examine the ways in which immigration has been affected by the national security 
interests and foreign policies of the United States, as well as the way in which 
immigration has affected American national security concerns and resulting foreign 
policy. They argue that immigration impacts US foreign policy to an extent that it 
threatens America’s national security, by listing the ways in which this had occurred, 
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but without delving into the details of how it has done so, or how these findings might 
apply in other contexts.  
A more comprehensive examination of how the ethnic lobby operates 
distinctively in the US is undertaken in Weil (1974), which looks at the potential for a 
“black” lobby for Africa in America, based on a framework developed on the 
successes of post-war Jewish and Polish-Catholic lobbies in the USA. Weil suggests 
that ethnic influence over American foreign policy requires that the lobby: provoke a 
feasible electoral threat of its abilities to shift loyalties from one of the two political 
parties in America to the other; possess a lobbying apparatus (i.e. the know-how and 
adequate resources to gain access to and court American policymakers), and; a 
successful appeal to the symbols of American nationhood.  
This study is an excellent example of a work that undertakes a task similar to 
that which I undertake in this project, as it identifies key variables to explain how a 
diaspora can impact the foreign policymaking process in the host state. However the 
study neglects to examine the motivations behind lobbying efforts of the diasporas, 
how they mobilize into robust political lobby groups, and how these motivations 
impact their successes, which are elements I examine in my alternative explanation. 
Also, it does not adequately analyse which of the variables is likely more significant 
in influencing the outcome, as my project seeks to do.  
In sum, there unquestionably exists an important and emergent body of 
scholarship that incorporates diaspora politics, and that highlights and advances a 
collective understanding of the significance of the diasporic actor. Indeed, the 
literature on the subject is without a doubt growing in “leaps and bounds,” as 
Ostergaard-Nielson (2001, 219) points out. However, as I have demonstrated in this 
section, within the scope of diaspora politics there clearly remain areas that call for 
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further study to advance our understanding of the politics that diasporas participate in 
and contribute to in regard to foreign policymaking in their host states and what drives 
these activities.  
Moving on from the literature that has broadly established the diasporic 
political actor, I turn to literature on social movements and framing that examine how 
groups more broadly operate as political actors in policymaking.  
 
2.2 Group Emergence and Framing 
The purpose of this section is to look at different literatures on social movements 
which are found largely within works from the field of political sociology. I begin by 
explaining why social movement literature is applicable to my research topic in order 
to set the stage to examine if, when and how a diaspora can influence the foreign 
policy agenda of its host country toward its home country. I then move on to delineate 
the details of what this literature says about how groups emerge and frame issues to 
influence the policymaking process.  
 
2.2.1 Why Social Movement Literature 
There exists a plethora of different literatures on non-state actors like interest groups, 
NGOs, and Transnational Advocacy Networks (TANs) that are analogous to some 
degree to diasporas, as all are non-state actors pressing for political change.  However, 
diasporas are most like social movements and examining diasporas through a social 
movement literature lens makes the most sense.  
Social movements and diasporas are both informal, organic and less organized 
compared to interest groups and NGOs, which have prescribed structures and are 
often legally constituted and managed to at least a minimum level of professionalism. 
  10
This key difference in level of formal structure is significant because these aspects 
have important implications for their political motivations and their strategic 
flexibility.   
TANs possess a similar level of formal structure to diasporas and social 
movements but they also differ greatly from diasporas in a few critical ways. TANs 
are distinctive given the centrality of principled ideas or values in motivating their 
formation (Keck and Sikkink 1998, 1; Carpenter 2007, 101; Price 2003). As Keck and 
Sikkink (1998) explicitly explain, “we refer to transnational networks (rather than 
coalitions, movements, or civil society) to evoke the structured and structuring 
dimension in the actions of these complex agents, who not only participate in new 
areas of politics but also shape them” (4). The key aspirations of diasporas on the 
other hand are not essentially normative in the way that the aspirations of TANs are. 
Their concerns are not centred on promoting “new moral standards” (Price 1998), but 
rather they are motivated to preserve and promote their own identity. Social 
movements by comparison are defined more broadly as “collective challenges, based 
on common purposes and social solidarities in sustained interaction with elites, 
opponents, and authorities” (Tarrow 1998, 4) which is more incorporative of what 
characterizes diasporas. 
Also, their transnational nature, their transnational significance and their 
transnational impacts are emphasised in the literature that examines TANs. Social 
movement literature by contrast is centred on the domestic sphere, which is where my 
project on diasporas is focused.   
Finally, a great deal of the literature on various non-state actors in 
policymaking relies on a concept first developed and explored by leading social 
movement scholars: the idea of “framing”, which refers to: “conscious strategic 
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efforts by groups of people to fashion shared understandings of the world and of 
themselves that legitimate and motivate collective action” (McAdam 1996, 6). It was 
Irving Goffman (1974) who first came up with the term and other prominent social 
movement scholars subsequently expanded on it such as David Snow and colleagues 
(see for example: Snow, Zuchan and Eklund-Olsen 1980; Snow, Rochford, Worden 
and Benford 1986; Snow and Benford 1988; Hunt, Benford and Snow 1994; Snow, 
Cress, Downey and Jones 1998), John McCarthy and colleagues (McCarthy, Britt and 
Wolfson 1991; McAdam, McCarthy and Zald 1996. For earlier related ideas also see: 
McCarthy and Zald 1973), and Sidney Tarrow (see for example Tarrow 1994; Tarrow 
1996; Tarrow 1998; Tarrow 2000; Tarrow 2006). Many non-social movement non-
state actor literatures take ideas developed in social movement literature, including for 
instance: Keck and Sikkink (1998), Bob (2005), Sell and Prakash (2004), Busby 
(2007) and Rothman (2008), to name just a few.  
Having established the relevance of social movement literature to my 
particular project on diasporas compared to others, I now turn to explore what it 
actually says about why and how groups emerge, and what the variables are that 
facilitate their emergence, their subsequent political action, and their successes.  
The literature on social movements commonly refers to three variables that 
help explain these questions: the organizational forms from which groups take shape, 
or their mobilizing structures; the larger institutional and cultural settings in the 
political environment in which they operate, or the political opportunity structure, 
and; the efforts by groups of people to recognize and fashion shared understandings of 
themselves and their environment that motivate and sustain collective action, or their 
framing processes.   
 
  12
2.2.2 Mobilizing Structures 
Mobilizing structures configure social networks and comprise the building blocks of 
social movements. They are “the collective vehicles, informal as well as formal, 
through which people mobilize and engage in collective action” (McAdam, McCarthy 
and Zald 1996, 3). When members of a group aggrieved by an issue are bound 
together by different structural factors that produce group solidarity, individuals are 
more likely to engage in group action (Fireman and Gamson 1979).  
Particularly in instances when one has “no exit” from a group, such as an 
ethnic identity, motivations to engage in collective action are especially compelling. If 
the group is engaging in collective action, he or she has a big stake in the group’s fate 
and might find it quite difficult not to participate when seemingly everyone is 
involved (Staggenborg 2008, 31). In his prominent work The Logic of Collection 
Action (1965), Olsen argues that the rationally-minded individual is not likely to 
participate in collective action because no one individual will make a difference in 
collective action, and the outcome (or public good) of the collective action will be 
received or not received regardless if they participate. They would only be compelled 
to participate if they were offered selective incentives (where benefits are received 
only by those who participate), have a strong chance of making a difference (as in a 
small group setting), or are coerced. While this may be true of some circumstances 
such as with members of interest groups or NGOs, in other instances where group 
membership is tied to one’s fundamental identity, motivations are more complex and 
personal, involving subjective interpretations and emotions related to one’s own sense 
of self. 
Coercion by other members of the community may be the ultimate motivation 
for collective action in groups tied together by ethnic identity in some situations, 
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perhaps in order to avoid stigma around being perceived as against the will or 
concerns of the group, or even to avoid threat of bodily harm. However, in all cases, 
in considering their participation, individuals who are members of a diaspora engage 
in emotional and complicated individual evaluations, from considering their possibly 
ambiguous or contradictory desires, to assessing their own goals and values as well as 
those of their communities and societies, to navigating possible conflicts within them. 
This is not to say that actors motivated by identity are not necessarily rational, but 
deciding whether and how to engage in contentious politics can go beyond the 
straightforward rational calculations presented by Olsen (1965), and emotions related 
to one’s own reality and identity can be very much tied up with how they calculate 
their interests, and in turn, why and how they ‘do’ contentious politics.  
 
2.2.3 The Political Opportunity Structure 
The political opportunity structure acts as a guiding mechanism for how the world 
appears and should be interpreted, influencing what is possible and impossible. It 
refers to the conditions and circumstances that provide chances to gain certain 
rewards or goals, as determined by the way the society within which the group 
operates is organized and arranged. As McCarthy, Britt and Wolfson (1991) explain, 
“When people come together to pursue collective action… the elements of the 
environment have manifold direct and indirect consequences for people’s common 
decisions about how to define their social change goals and how to organize and 
proceed in pursuing those goals” (46). In other words, looking at the political 
opportunity structure attempts to investigate the circumstances that permit the scope 
and success of social movements.  
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 While there exists a debate among political opportunity structure scholars as to 
how different types of political opportunities should be classified,2 for explanatory 
purposes I identify two general types along the lines of those identified by academics 
such as Gamson and Meyer (1996) and Wahlström and Peterson (2006): institutional 
political opportunities and cultural political opportunities. Institutional political 
opportunities specifically refer to the broader set of constraints and prospects unique 
to the institutional political contexts in which they are embedded. They range from the 
type of the formal governmental system (e.g. traits specific to parliamentary systems), 
to the patterns of linkage between civil society and the government. 
Generally, cultural political opportunities are cultural understandings and 
interpretations which affect prospects for collective action. As argued by Ross (1997), 
“culture is a framework for organizing the world, for locating the self and others in it, 
for making sense of the actions and interpreting motives of others, for grounding an 
analysis, for linking collective identities to political action and for motivating people 
and groups towards some actions and away from others” (42). They are important to 
look at it in addition to institutional opportunities because as Gamson and Meyer 
(1996) point out, “opportunity has a strong cultural component and we miss 
something important when we limit our attention to variance in political institutions 
and the relationships among political actors” (279). Cultural opportunities refer to 
factors like historical context, dominant societal world-views, and norms that shape 
the discourse available to the group (Ferree, Gamson, Gerhards and Rucht 2002).  
 
                                                 
2 The debate I am referring to is around whether cultural aspects of society should be seen as a separate 
type of political opportunity from the formal and informal power relations of the political system, or 
whether there should be one classification of political opportunity structure, which would include 
power relations as well as cultural elements of the general societal structural environment such as 
values, myths and world-views. See Gamson and Meyer (1996) as well as Wahlström and Peterson 
(2006) for good explanations of this discussion.  
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2.2.4 Framing 
As I briefly touched on earlier, framing can be best described as: “conscious strategic 
efforts by groups of people to fashion shared understandings of the world and of 
themselves that legitimate and motivate collective action” (McAdam 1996, 6. For 
other similar explanations of framing, see for instance: Goffman 1974; Snow, 
Rochford, Worden, Benford 1986; Snow and Benford 1988). It is through framing 
that shared collective meaning among the participants is negotiated and constructed. 
Frames themselves are specific metaphors and symbolic representations of these 
meanings. They are used as cognitive clues to cast behaviour and events in an 
evaluative mode in order to suggest alternative modes of action (Zald 1996, 262). 
Framing is achieved through three core tasks: diagnostic framing, prognostic framing 
and motivational framing.  
Diagnostic framing is where the problem or injustice is identified and political 
goals are determined, through the assigning of blame and the defining of who the 
protagonists and antagonists are. For diasporas seeking to influence the foreign policy 
agenda of its host state toward its home state, this is where determining the policy 
issue that the host state should be concerned about would be fleshed out.  
Prognosis framing involves the expression of a proposed solution and the 
strategies for the plan of attack. A diaspora that wants to impact the host state foreign 
policy agenda regarding its home state might engage in prognosis framing to 
articulate a call to action on the specific solutions needed to be carried out on the issue 
delineated regarding its home state. The process of prognosis framing often involves 
“counterframing” or refutations by opponents of the group’s logic and the efficacy of 
their solutions, and as a result, the movement is compelled to develop a more 
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elaborate and evolved rationale for remedies to solve the problem at hand (Benford 
and Snow 2000, 617).  
Motivational framing is where the justification for action is articulated. It 
refers to the framing techniques used by activists to motivate people to participate in 
collective action by stirring within them senses of various reasons as to why they 
should be compelled to act on the movement’s behalf. For a diaspora working to 
influence the foreign policy agenda of its host state toward its home state, 
motivational frames would be used to articulate normative reasons that are dominant 
in the political opportunity structure as to why the host state should get in involved.  
 
2.2.5 How Mobilizing Structures, the Political Opportunity Structure and Framing 
Work Together 
 
Mobilizing structures, the political opportunity structure and framing all facilitate 
social movements, but none alone determines how and when what kinds of outcomes 
will materialize. Collective action will not materialize without a mobilizing structure, 
and a mobilizing structure may impact the world view of the members of the 
movement, in turn influencing the frames the group uses to appeal to the various 
policymakers. On the other hand, mobilizing structures do not entirely determine the 
frames promoted by the members, because they are still actors with agency who 
interpret the world around them. Similarly, the political opportunity structure 
influences the actions of social movement groups insofar as being able to shape 
prospects for collective action, but they do not themselves determine collective action 
per se. The reason is because, as scholarship on social movements and framing 
observes, social movement organizations are dynamic agents who produce and propel 
interpretations for constituents, antagonists, and bystanders or observers (Benford and 
Snow 1988). These groups are “not… merely carriers of extant ideas and meanings 
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that grow automatically out of structural arrangements, unanticipated events, or 
existing ideologies… They engage in active, process-based work by deliberately 
generating interpretive frames, that differ from existing ones, and that may challenge 
them (Benford and Snow 2000, 613-614). Explanations based on variation in 
opportunities stress the influence of environmental factors (McAdam, McCarthy and 
Zald 1996), implying that social movements unfold or succeed when actors 
predictably respond to new opportunities (Ganz 2004). But while who the relevant 
policymakers are and even their very access to them will be determined by the 
political opportunity structure in which the group is operating, a successful group will 
make these identifications and utilize images and ideas relevant to the historical and 
cultural contexts of the political goings-on of the day and to the world views of 
policymakers in order to achieve their own goals. In short, institutional structures and 
political and cultural circumstances can determine what a group deems as possible 
and desirable, as well as create resources and opportunities, but their significance, and 
what constitutes them, emerges from the hearts, hands and heads of the actors who put 
them to work (Ganz 1996, 196-197).  
For diasporas this would mean that, like social movements more broadly, they 
possess flexibility and agency in terms of being able to identify and exploit the 
resources and opportunities available to them to further their political objectives. On 
the other hand however, because their motivations are identity-based, they are 
restricted in a way by their political goals, solutions and calls to action, which in turn 
will be influenced by how the structural environment in which they have been 
engendered compliment what they are trying to achieve.  
While framing gives freedom to actors in the process, there are several 
specific ways that framing efforts of groups are limited by the political opportunity 
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structure. First, frames must be presented in a time and place when there are relevant 
political opportunities available. Kingdon (2003) refers to these episodes as “policy 
windows.”  Similarly, this is what Tarrow (1994) defines as a “cycle of contention” or 
the consistent dimension of a given political environment that provides incentives for 
people to undertake collective action, affecting their expectations of success or 
failure. In other words, this refers to the susceptibility of the target participants to 
change sought by the movement at a given time.  
Second, frames must be salient to the larger belief systems of target 
participants. They must appeal to the ideas and beliefs through which they hold and 
use to interpret the world and interact through. If the frames being presented do not 
appeal to what the potential participants deem as being of importance in this regard, 
they will likely be discounted. They means that they must be culturally believable, 
provide plenty of evidence, be presented in a consistent fashion, and be articulated by 
people and groups who are deemed to be realistic and believable (Benford and Snow 
2000, 619-620). The frames must have what Fisher (1984) calls “narrative fidelity” – 
which is to say that the ideas expressed within the frame must be fundamental to the 
personal lives of the potential participants and congruent with their cultural 
ideologies. Because the identity component of the mobilization mechanism for 
diasporas, this would mean that a successful frame would not only have to align with 
the belief systems of policymakers that they are trying to reach, but also with those of 
the members of the diaspora.  
Snow and Benford (1988) posit that once frames have been constructed and 
promoted according to the requirements as described above, a change can be reached, 
or “frame alignment” can occur. Frame alignment refers to the point when a mutually 
recognized link is established between a group’s proposed goals, solutions and 
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rationales for action and those of the potential adherents, thereby motivating them into 
action. An underlying premise about frame alignment however, is that it is an organic 
process that may happen over time through framing adaptation, learning and 
adjustment. In other words, frames are not static entities. They can change and can be 
reworked if necessary in ways that make them fluid and dynamic in nature (Mooney 
and Hunt 1996, 178), and that take advantage of contextual opportunities, in order to 
appeal to potential supporters, or even counter opponents (McCammon, Hewitt, Smith 
2004, 531). This process can involve one or more of several different kinds of framing 
activities, including frame bridging, frame amplification, frame extensions, and frame 
transformation.  
Frame bridging involves connecting the movement to potential participants 
who possess views or grievances that are similar to or shared with those in the social 
movement, but who are not yet mobilized. For these aggregates of individuals, 
collective action is not preceded by a collective consciousness per se, but by being 
drawn in through frame diffusion via personal or intergroup networks, the media, or 
direct outreach. In other words, the movement connects the dots between their 
concerns and those of the potential participants with the frames.   
Frame amplification involves overcoming ambiguities and uncertainties 
potential participants may find in the movement’s existing frame by clarifying or 
stressing a particular interpretive frame, in order to motivate their mobilization into 
the social movement. For example, McCammon, Hewitt, and Smith (2004) found that 
American woman suffragists amplified their frame regarding the demand for women’s 
voting rights in different ways, in order to take advantage of the different cultural 
outlooks possessed by different target participants. They focused on the argument that 
women should vote because they are men’s equals and therefore should have political 
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rights equal to men, and as well, they emphasized that women should have the ballot 
because they possess distinctive womanly experiences and perspectives, which would 
bring a unique contribution to politics and make society a more humane place. In 
trying to get a host government to intervene in a homeland war, a diaspora might play 
up a human rights angle to appeal to policymakers focused on humanitarian concerns 
as well as emphasize the importance of other political norms that should be 
encouraged internationally such as multiculturalism values.  
Frame extension is a movement’s attempt to incorporate targeted participants 
into the movement and enlarge its adherent pool by actually extending the confines of 
the proposed frame and portraying its objectives or activities as being congruent with 
those of potential participants who might not otherwise be interested in the issue. For 
example, Snow, Rochford, Worden, and Benford (1986) describe a community 
movement in Austin, Texas initially comprised of a group of local business owners 
who were opposed to the prospect of a Salvation Army shelter being built in their area 
(472). To serve their own interests, the group attempted to win the support of 
neighbourhood residents throughout the city by extending their frame through the 
identification of their interests with those of all residents in general. Their rallying 
slogan became: “Let's Save 6th Street - Austin's Neighborhood.” Once the frame was 
extended, organizers played upon and amplified the virtues of the neighbourhood, in 
the hopes of mobilizing residents’ support to help persuade the city council to make 
the Salvation Army put the shelter somewhere else. An example of such a frame that a 
diaspora might present to get people interested in events happening in their home 
country might be to conjure and play-up images of shared human rights principles and 
the idea that both countries belong to the “international community” and hold 
responsibilities to get involved in events taking place in far-away parts of the world.  
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Sometimes, however, no matter how well a frame is bridged, amplified or 
extended, the causes that a social movement promotes may not resonate with the 
existing conventional beliefs of target participants. When such is the case, in order to 
garner support and secure participants, actual new beliefs and values may have to be 
planted and nurtured, and “erroneous beliefs” or “misframings” reframed within the 
minds of target participants (Goffman 1974, 308). This is what Snow, Rochford, 
Worden, and Benford (1986) call frame transformation. It occurs when new values, 
meanings and understandings of an existing frame are developed in order to secure 
the mobilization and support of new participants into the movement. For example, in 
the case of the campaign against drunk driving in the USA, Turner (1983) indicates 
that participation was transformed from seeing what was once considered to be 
merely a terrible accident to redefining it as an inexcusable injustice perpetrated by 
careless individuals which demands increased penalties for those who drive drunk. In 
a diaspora example, it might be to transform the perception of host country 
policymakers around actors in an event occurring in the homeland from legitimate to 





















Explanations and Research Design 
 
This chapter outlines the nuts and bolts of this thesis project. I begin it by first 
defining the major conceptual terms that I use throughout the paper for the purposes 
of clarity and transparency. Next I delineate the scope of my project. After that, I go 
in depth to describe the primary and alternative explanations I am testing as well as 
their respective indicators that I have developed in order to examine pertinent 
phenomenon I must see or not see to help me analyse which explanation is better 
suited in light of the evidence. The chapter concludes with a description and 
explanation of my case study selection as well as the research methods I have chosen 
for the project.  
 
3.1 Definitions 
Before beginning to explain in detail my primary and alternative arguments or the key 
elements of my research design, I will first briefly define and demarcate the main 
conceptual terms that I use throughout the paper so to be clear on precisely what I 
mean when I make reference to them. 
 Diasporas are communities that are separated physically from their homelands 
but that are attached emotionally and psychologically to their homelands. I 
specifically use the term to refer to a group of people defined by the following 
characteristics: residing outside the physical borders of its common ethnic, religious 
or national homeland (see Cohen 1997, ix; Van Hear 1998, 6), refusing to completely 
assimilate into the host society, as well as a tendency toward feeling obligated to the 
home society (Cohen 1997, 23-26; Adamson and Demetriou 2007). In regard to the 
subject matter of this project, this is demonstrated by political activity aimed at 
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influencing the foreign policy of its host country toward its home country, in order to 
defend and protect its identity, as it relates to its ethnic community in its homeland.  
I use the term foreign policy agenda to refer to the issues being discussed 
within policymaking circles which may relate to a given or potential foreign policy. 
An elemental feature in the general policymaking process,3 I borrow from Kingdon 
(2003)’s definition of the term policy agenda: “the list of the subjects or problems to 
which governmental officials, and people outside of government closely associated 
with these officials, are paying some serious attention at any given time” (3). Having 
policymakers paying serious attention to a matter could be indicated by one or more 
of any of the following: repeated statements or press releases on the matter issued by 
policymakers; oral debates or discussion within a parliamentary body such as the 
House of Commons; a written report on the subject by a government body; a 
government or private member bill relating to the issue, or; government activity or 
conduct relating to the issue which may indicate action on the policy issue.4   
For the purposes of this project, I refer to a policymaker as an actor within or 
close to the government who is in a position to affect the policy agenda stage of the 
policymaking process. Such actors include elected leaders in government and others 
working on behalf of the government. Where necessary, I distinguish between these 
types of policymakers.5 Elected leaders refer to Members of Parliament or 
representatives of voters from another level of government such as a local council.  
                                                 
3 As explained by Simon (1966), 19, for example.  
4 While the focus of this project is to examine whether a diaspora influences the foreign policy agenda 
as opposed to a foreign policy per se, evidence of change in direction to government activity would 
naturally indicate that the foreign policy agenda was affected, as an issue must be on the agenda in 
order for government to act on the issue.  
5 Generally speaking, it is well understood that policymaking power is possessed by many different 
actors inside and outside of government, such as political staff, the media and the bureaucracy. 
However, I characterize these various actors under the one heading of ‘policymaker,’ as their 
delineation is not always critical in the context of this paper. Their differentiation is spelled out clearly 
where necessary for clarity.  
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In the context of this project I use the term identity in a collective sense to 
refer to an individual’s sense of belonging to a group, which forms a part of his or 
her own personal identity. More specifically, this refers to a deliberate selection of 
cultural features by an individual which are used to stand as symbols of membership 
in a community (Manogaran and Pfaffenberger 1994). It is not something that an 
individual possesses inherently per se, but it is rather a social process in which 
individuals participate, in the context of their changing conditions. This is an 
important differentiation to make in order to make clear the specific phenomenon I 
look at in this thesis, with regard to what politically motivates diasporas. 
The political opportunity structure refers to the broader set of constraints and 
prospects unique to the institutional and cultural political contexts in which they are 
embedded such as patterns of linkage between civil society and government, historical 
context and dominant societal world-views and norms that shape the discourse 
available to the group (see Ferree, Gamson, Gerhards and Rucht 2002). The term 
norm in this project follows the delineation as laid out by Ann Florini (1996), who 
defines it as an intersubjective understanding of standards of behaviour, of how an 
actor should legitimately behave, like a structure shaping an actor’s conduct (364-365. 
Also see for example: Finnemore 1994, 2; Thomson 1993, 72). 
A mobilized group refers to a group sharing grievances and interests that has 
gained collective control over resources with the goal of serving those interests and 
resolving those grievances (Tilly 1978, 54). This may refer to many different types of 
resources from organizational capacity to communications and lobbying savvy. To 
say that a group has gained ‘collective control’ is to say that the group is rather 
cohesive in terms of the overall level of commitment of members to the cause and that 
it is well-organized structurally. Group mobilization occurs through mobilizing 
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structures, or the informal as well as formal organizations and networks through 
which people engage in collective action (McAdam, McCarthy and Zald 1996, 3). As 
Tarrow (1998) explains, mobilizing structures “bring people together in the field, 
shape coalitions, confront opponents, and assure their own future” (123).  
I specifically refer to framing as the construction of collective meanings by 
groups of people to cast the world and themselves in an evaluative mode in order to 
legitimate and motivate collective action (McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald 1996, 6) 
around a specific foreign policy issue in the host state relating to a diaspora’s home 
country. Frames themselves are the specific metaphors and symbolic representations 
of those interpretations and meanings.  
 
3.2 Scope 
Each step in the course through which diasporas might affect foreign policy are 
critical and intricate, however this project will focus on a specific segment of a multi-
step process. If a diaspora were to influence their host-country’s foreign policy, the 
process would begin with people from a given ethnic group in the world entering and 
settling in another country. Next, the diaspora as a community would begin to form 
and solidify, based on commonly identified values rooted in their ethnic identity. In 
other words, to borrow a concept coined by Anderson (1983), an ‘imagined 
community’ would materialize, based on a common mental image of their 
communion and comradeship (6-7). The diaspora would then articulate concerns 
about the home country to policymakers. Next, host country policymakers would 
become concerned with the issue and in turn, place the issue onto the foreign policy 
agenda. Subsequently, policymakers would decide to create or change foreign policy 
regarding the diaspora’s home country.  
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This project does not focus on the entirety of this intricate process. I examine 
if, when and how a diaspora influences policymakers to impact the foreign policy 
agenda so my argument stops at the influence of the policy agenda before a change to 
an actual policy occurs. I focus on the influence of diasporas on foreign policy 
agendas as opposed to official foreign policies per se, because while the ultimate 
goals of all types of advocacy groups are usually new policies or policy change, such 
aspirations are not always accomplished.  
In policymaking, there are many opportunities for actors to push through 
policy, but sometimes the possible avenues for change get overloaded, sometimes 
opportunities are missed, and sometimes unforeseen events happen that ultimately 
favour some policies over others (Kingdon 2003, 165-195). While evidence that 
shows that diasporas have influenced a foreign policy agenda does not necessarily 
mean that they influenced policy, examining their influence in the process still 
matters. The emergence of an issue onto a policy agenda serves as the starting 
position in the classical four-stage policymaking process which is comprised of: the 
setting of the agenda or the problem definition; the specification of alternatives from 
which a choice is to be made; a policy choice or formation, and; policy 
implementation and policy evaluation (Kingdon 1984, 2-3). Examining the first part 
of the policymaking process and what influences it is academically useful because 
what is on the policy agenda today may directly affect what actually turns into a 
policy down the road. For this reason, Ostergaard-Nielson (2001a) argues in her book 
chapter which broadly surveys diasporas in world politics: “Diaspora groups’ ability 
to establish channels of dialogue and get their message across to political 
representatives and institutions of the host country, or homeland, or at an international 
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My research seeks to answer the following series of interrelated questions: can 
diasporas influence the foreign policy agendas of their host countries regarding their 
home countries? If they can, when do they do it and how do they do it? To tackle this 
theoretical query, I have devised a primary explanation to test and based on my 
findings in the literature review, I have also devised an alternative explanation to test 
in order to help establish a plausible compelling explanation for diaspora influence in 
host-state foreign policymaking. Additionally, I have also developed indictors for 
each explanation that comprise of values I must find evidence of in each case which 
would determine that the explanation is wrong. When I examine and analyse the case 
studies in the next two chapters, these indicators will help me determine which 
explanation is better suited in light of the evidence. 
The primary explanation I test is that host country foreign policymakers 
(intervening variable) are likely to place a diaspora’s home country policy issue onto 
the host-country foreign policy agenda (dependent variable) as a result of a diaspora’s 
electoral influence (independent variable). I will know that the primary explanation is 
incorrect if I find evidence in the case studies to suggest that host-country 
policymakers placed a diaspora’s home-country policy issue onto the host-country 
foreign policy agenda and if I find sufficient evidence to suggest that the diaspora did 
not have electoral influence. Sufficient evidence that would negate the electoral 
influence explanation would include data indicating that the diaspora did not represent 
a sizeable voting bloc, that the diaspora did not effectively rally voters to their cause 
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to make it a hot-button election issue, and that the diaspora did not significantly 
contribute to the political campaigns of key policymakers. When I refer to the idea of 
not representing a sizeable voting bloc I mean not representing a portion of the 
electorate able to potentially and credibly influence the outcome of an election 
through its members’ votes. When I refer to the idea of not effectively rallying voters 
to the cause I mean not convincing a large portion of the electorate on the validity of 
the cause to an extent that policy discussions around the cause would affect their vote. 
When I refer to the idea of not significantly contributing to the political campaigns of 
key policymakers I mean not making sizeable financial or other types contributions 
that would notably add to the campaign resources or campaign outcomes of key 
policymakers.  
The alternative explanation I test is that host country foreign policymakers 
(intervening variable) are likely to place a diaspora’s home country policy issue onto 
the host country foreign policy agenda (dependent variable) if the diaspora effectively 
frames the issue in ways that engage and appeal to policymakers (independent 
variable). I will know that the alternative explanation is incorrect if I find evidence in 
the case studies to suggest that host-country policymakers placed a diaspora’s home-
country policy issue onto the host-country foreign policy agenda and also find 
sufficient evidence to suggest that the diaspora did not frame its home country policy 
issue effectively to policymakers. Sufficient evidence to negate the explanation of 
policymaker influence through effective diaspora framing would include data 
indicating that the diaspora was not mobilized, that it did not devise and promote 
frames to policymakers that were relevant to and representative of the given political 
opportunity structure, and that the policy agenda did not mimic specific key messages 
and ideas present in the frames.  
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When I refer to the idea of a diaspora that is not mobilized I mean a diasporic 
group that does not possess shared grievances and interests relating to a collective 
sense of identity tied up with its homeland ethnic community and that has not gained 
collective control over resources with the goal of serving those interests and resolving 
those grievances (see Tilly 1978, 54). A group that has not gained collective control is 
to say that the group is not cohesive in terms of the overall level of commitment of 
members to the cause, that it is not well-organized structurally, and/or that it is not 
sizeable enough to make a convincing potential impact relative to the given foreign 
policymaking context. Group resources refer to things like organizational capacity 
and communications and lobbying savvy. When I refer to the idea that a diaspora did 
not devise and promote frames to policymakers that are relevant to and representative 
of the given political opportunity structure I mean that frames were not created and 
advocated that relate to metaphors and symbolic representations of collective 
interpretations and meanings that cast the world and themselves in an evaluative mode 
in order to legitimate and motivate collective action (see McAdam, McCarthy, and 
Zald 1996, 6) and that they were not communicated by the diaspora to policymakers 
in ways that take advantage of the arrangement of the given cultural and institutional 
political conditions in the given society. A frame would be indicated by repeated 
public communications about a policy issue, as demonstrated through evidence 
gleaned from press releases, quotes in news articles, speeches, interviews etc.  
 
3.4 Research Method and Case Selection 
The guiding purpose of this project is to contribute a better understanding of the role 
of the diaspora as a distinctive type of non-state actor and its role in influencing 
foreign policymaking in its host state. Empirical analysis methodology based on 
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quantitative data and large-n studies tell us more about whether hypotheses hold, than 
why they hold as case-studies do (Van Evera 1997, 55) and historical approaches seek 
particular understandings of an event in context (Bloodgood and Nishino, 69). Given 
that it is a larger process which may be observed in similar conditions elsewhere to 
those explored in my project is what I seek to understand, I chose to employ a case 
study qualitative analysis, rather than quantitative analysis or an historical process 
tracing approach. Additionally, I have chosen to use a comparative case design so I 
am able to control for extraneous factors while looking in-depth at my variables to 
help me see clear signs of their effects. This design helps me to create a more 
controlled environment, limiting the effects of other variable factors by holding them 
relatively constant (Van Evera 1997, 52).  
The cases that I have chosen to examine in this project are the Sri Lankan 
Tamil diasporas in Britain and in Canada and their respective roles in influencing 
British and Canadian foreign policy agendas with regard to Sri Lanka’s civil war with 
the LTTE. In order to get a full picture of the history and character of these two 
diasporas, the time periods during which the case studies are being examined is 1983, 
which is roughly when the civil conflict began and when refugees began to leave in 
large numbers from Sri Lanka, until the end of the civil war in the spring of 2009. To 
a more limited degree for background knowledge, I also look at earlier periods 
leading up to the civil war. 
The main reason why I chose these case studies is because I expect them to be 
likely cases for the alternative explanation and thus crucial cases to test against the 
primary argument. Thus, I expect to find sufficient evidence in my case studies to 
suggest that the issue of the Sri Lankan war was reflected in each country’s foreign 
policy agenda and that the diasporas engaged in effective framing process appealing 
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to policymaking on the issue. I have set up the project in this way because if the 
primary explanation can be shown to be the more compelling explanation when 
conditions are less favourable, I can credibly deduce that it is likely to be a 
compelling explanation in more favourable circumstances as well. If I find that the 
alternative explanation is not the most compelling explanation, given that it is being 
tested in more favourable conditions I will be able to dismiss it as a valid explanation. 
These case studies are favourable for the alternative explanation because they 
both possess a few crucial characteristics (see Figure 1 for a summary comparison of 
the case studies). One of these critical characteristics is the size of the specific Sri 
Lankan Tamil diasporas being examined. While assessments vary around the actual 
size of the Tamil diaspora in each country,6 Human Rights Watch estimates that these 
two countries host the two largest Sri Lankan Tamil diaspora communities in the 
world, together hosting nearly half of the global Sri Lankan Tamil diaspora (Human 
Rights Watch 2006, 10). It is estimated that by the end of conflict, there were 
approximately 100,000-200,000 Sri Lankan Tamils in the UK, and approximately 
200,000-250,000 in Canada. This characteristic is key because it would likely mean 
that the diasporas had a large community to draw from to gain resources and to 
credibly promote frames about the war to policymakers. It might also mean that as 
immigrants, they would be less able to exert electoral influence because of voting 
restrictions in each country on the participation of non-citizens. 
                                                 
6 Tamils statistics the world over vary substantially between figures provided by governments, 
academic experts and groups representing the diasporas. While normally government statistics from 
well-established democracies like Canada and the UK may be taken to be the most accurate, there are a 
few reasons to consider other relevant data in this case, and to question how much Tamils would self-
identify in a census. Many Tamils outside of Sri Lanka are war-scarred refugees, who may or may not 
be under intimidation by the Sri Lankan government or the LTTE. In addition, Tamil is a language that 
is spoken by many people who were not born in Sri Lanka (there is an entire Tamil state in India for 
example), so determining figures based on language is an inappropriate way to gather the data. Given 
the complex political and geographical realties of this group, other relevant data cannot be ignored in 
order to gain the widest, most accurate picture of the population (For similar points see: English 2009; 
Zunzer 2004; Venugopal 2003). 
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Also, both countries generally have several million residents who were foreign 
born, and in both countries the rate of immigration to each country is growing 
exponentially (see Canada Statistics Canada 2007 and United Kingdom 2005a).7 
While most industrialized countries are experiencing mass influxes of immigrants 
today, immigration is a particularly definitive issue in Britain and Canada, as both are 
world leaders in welcoming immigrants. While Canada accepts more immigrants on a 
per capita basis than the UK (Canada 2009c), the UK accepts more immigrants than 
most other countries in Europe.8  
These similarities with regard to the immigration picture of both Britain and 
Canada are important to point out for a couple reasons. First, they help control for 
cultural and political bias against immigrants. This is not to say that discrimination 
and racism do not exist within these two societies or within their respective political 
establishments (as no society could claim such an achievement), but a more open 
cultural outlook within the political establishment toward immigrants is probably 
what this aspect indicates. This allows for the theoretical likelihood that diasporas 
could engage policymakers 
Secondly, there is a noteworthy institutional factor that is similar in both of the 
host countries of the case studies: Britain and Canada are both parliamentary 
democracies. The nature of the institutional setting likely supports the ability of, or 
ease with which, a diaspora can gain access to policymakers. Also, looking at case 
studies within two parliamentary democracies contributes to having relatively 
                                                 
7 According to the most recent data available for each country, Canada was home to 6.1 million 
foreign-born people according to the 2006 census, the highest proportion of foreign-born population in 
75 years; 4.9 million of the total population of the UK were born overseas - more than double the 
number in 1951, and between 1991 and 2001, greater than in any of the preceding post-war decades 
(See Canada Statistics Canada 2007 and United Kingdom 2005a). Note: The UK conducts censuses 
every 10 years, and based on its immigration trends and growth rate, I would expect to see data in the 
2011 census showing a much larger foreign-born segment of the population, with numbers much closer 
to those of Canada.  
8 In 2002, the UK was one of the four EU25 countries that between them received 71 per cent of the net 
inflow of immigrants into the EU25 (United Kingdom 2005b). 
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consistent institutional settings, which helps me to focus on the variable elements of 
the case study environments. While the similarities between the case studies have 
implications for the generalizability of my findings, choosing case studies with a 
limited number of environmental differences allows me to be more confident in the 
findings that I do conclude.   
The cases also possess some variable features which necessitate qualification. 
The composition and character of the Tamil immigrant communities in each country 
vary to some degree. While both Britain and Canada are home to many Tamils who 
have fled the civil war in Sri Lanka, Canada is disproportionately so. In 1983, there 
were fewer than 2,000 Tamils in Canada (Aruliah 1994) and by 1999 Sri Lanka was 
the leading source of refugee claimants to Canada (Hyndman 2003, 251). Britain’s 
Tamil diaspora on the other hand has a much longer history in the country. While it is 
home to thousands of civil war refugees as Canada is, Britain was already home to a 
substantial Tamil diaspora decades before the civil war in Sri Lanka broke out. It is 
considerably comprised of many people who were students and business people 
seeking opportunities abroad, who left after Sri Lanka’s independence was gained 
from Britain in 1948 (Valentine 1996, 155). The Tamil identity possessed by the 
diaspora in Britain may not be as strongly tied to the homeland and the violence 
experienced there as that of Canada’s diaspora and this may have implications for 
their respective abilities and for their desires to mobilize and engage in framing 
processes around the same objectives and frames. If the British diaspora were able to 
mobilize and engage policymakers I would expect that frames would need to be broad 
enough to be sufficiently inclusive of the varied experiences and concerns of members 
of the diaspora but specific enough to inspire mobilization and to appeal to 
policymakers. 
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There is also an important variation regarding the histories of each country and 
their possible implications for the findings. One crucial distinction is the UK’s 
colonial past as a former ruler of Sri Lanka that Canada does not possess. As a result 
Britain might be more hesitant and sensitive to the idea of getting involved in the 
internal affairs of a sovereign nation that it once had power over. Another different 
experience of note that the UK and Canada have had is with militant domestic 
separatism, which may have led to different policy biases and predispositions within 
each government regarding dealing with a foreign conflict that involves a separatist 
faction, like the LTTE, within a democratic society, like Sri Lanka.  
The UK has had a much longer, more tumultuous and more complex history 
with domestic nationalism and revolutionary separatism. Britain’s conflict with the 
Irish Republic Army (IRA) for instance lasted nearly a century and involved copious 
episodes of violence and bloodshed perpetrated by both sides that ultimately led to the 
deaths of hundreds of people. Canada has also experienced violent domestic 
separatism, as exemplified in its dealings with the Quebec nationalist group Front de 
libération du Québec (FLQ) and in its experience with the “October Crisis.”9 
However Canadians experienced no where near the same scale of conflict with the 
FLQ as was suffered in the UK with the IRA. After the grave but brief October Crisis 
incident, public support in Canada, particularly in Quebec, was largely galvanized 
against violent efforts for Quebec sovereignty, pushing the movement towards 
                                                 
9 The FLQ was an aggressive separatist organization active in Quebec between 1963 and 1970 which 
was responsible for more than 160 acts of violence. Its attacks, which ultimately killed eight people and 
injured dozens more, included the bombing of mailboxes in affluent Montreal neighbourhoods, and 
most notably, the Montreal Stock Exchange in 1969. In 1970, the violence culminated in what is 
referred to as the “October Crisis.” After a British trade commissioner was kidnapped and a Quebec 
government minister murdered, Canada’s Governor General invoked the War Measures Act, at the 
request of Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau, with the support of the Quebec Premier and the Montreal 
Mayor. This action resulted in the deployment of Canadian military troops throughout Quebec, as well 
as the provision of far-reaching powers to the police for detaining virtually anyone they deemed to be 
associated with the Quebec sovereignty movement (almost 500 people were arrested and just 62 were 
charged).  
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employing political means of attaining greater Quebec autonomy and independence or 
a more functional federalist solution. While the invocation of the War Measures Act 
to contain the escalating Quebec nationalist violence was criticized heavily after the 
fact for its suspension of civil liberties, it paled in comparison to the level of violence 
carried out by the British government in its attempt to suppress IRA uprisings and 
attacks over the last century. While the British government has had some less violent 
experiences with separatism and federalism in recent times, as seen for instance with 
Scottish devolution and the establishment of the new Scottish Parliament in 1998, 
over all Britain has had a much more turbulent experience with domestic separatism 
over the past century than Canada has. 
 
Figure 1: Summary Comparison of Case Studies 
 British case study 
 
Canadian case study 
Political system of host 
country 
Parliamentary democracy Parliamentary democracy 
General immigration picture 
of host country 
Large foreign born population; 
world leader in number of 
immigrants per capita 
Large foreign born population; 
world leader in number of 
immigrants per capita 
Immigration picture of Sri 
Lankan Tamils in host 
country  
100,000-200,000 Sri Lankan 
Tamils since approx. 1949 
200,000-250,000 Sri Lankan 
Tamils since approx. 1983 
Sri Lankan Tamil immigrants 
in host country 
Mix of economic/education 
migrants and refugees 
Mostly refugee population 
Experience with Sri Lanka Former colonial power of Sri 
Lanka 
No significant relationship with Sri 
Lanka 
Experience with violent 
domestic separatism  
Tumultuous, longer-term Staid, short-lived 
 
Another reason why I chose case studies in the UK and Canada separate from 
considerations about their favourability to the explanations being tested had to do with 
practicality: I personally had the best access to policymakers, diaspora members and 
other relevant primary sources of information within these two countries. During the 
course of researching for my thesis, I completed the intensive Parliamentary 
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Internship Programme in Ottawa managed by the Canadian Political Science 
Association through which I gained extraordinary access to policymakers and other 
notable political authorities and experts, as well as valuable first hand know-how 
about how Parliament Hill operates in practice, such as how to go about securing a 
meeting with an MP. Also, I moved to London, England subsequent to the internship 
where I completed much of the project, which offered me the benefit of proximity to 
potential UK interviewees. These prospective advantages proved fruitful as I was 
quite successful in corresponding with some very prominent and pertinent individuals 
to my research, as I describe in more detail below and in Appendix 2. 
For this thesis I conducted research in search of apposite newspaper articles, 
Hansard material, as well as press releases, speeches and other publications written by 
relevant politicians, political parties, government bodies and leaders within the 
diaspora communities being observed. I also engaged in personal correspondence 
with representative individuals of the diasporas being examined, relevant 
policymakers and other germane individuals.10 These people included staff and 
volunteers from groups representing the diasporas, researchers and other experts 
knowledgeable about or involved with the diasporas, and policymakers themselves 
who have first hand dealings with the issues discussed in the project, through their 
government portfolio work, through their constituencies, or other first-hand 
experiences. Working to ensure that my interviews were a representative sample was 
a top priority for me. I started the process of cultivating relationships to secure 
interviews as early as September 2008 while working on Parliament Hill, and I 
actively worked on setting up and conducting interviews from April 2010 to 
November 2010. Over all, I engaged in correspondence with 18 individuals for this 
                                                 
10 See Appendix 2 for detailed interview information.  
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project during the spring, summer and fall of 2010 in person, over the telephone, via 
letters and email, and through electronic instant messaging services on Facebook and 
Gmail.  
Eight of the people with whom I was able to engage were public professionals 
who agreed to be acknowledged and to have their names published in this study, such 
as current and former politicians and organizational spokespersons. The basic details 
of my correspondence with them are included in the interview information provided 
in Appendix 2. I actively sought interviews with people from many Tamil 
organizations in the UK and in Canada, sending out about a dozen letters and emails 
and making as many follow-up phone calls as was possible based on contact 
information available. However, I was only successful in connecting with one 
individual from one organization, the National Spokesperson from the Canadian 
Tamil Congress, which is probably the largest and most active Tamil organization in 
Canada, to whom I spoke twice. I was also able to meet with a Tamil Local 
Councillor in London who had extensive experience working and volunteering with 
different Tamil groups since he arrived in Britain as a refugee in 1985 and who as a 
public figure was very knowledgeable about Tamil organizations in Britain and even 
Canada. However, I would have been more satisfied had I been able to connect 
directly with at least a few more organizations from each country. On the other hand, 
given the small size of most of the Tamil organizations in Britain and Canada, and the 
political risks associated with talking to outsiders of the Tamil community especially 
since the end of the war, the level of success of my attempts is not that surprising.  
My success in reaching relevant non-Tamil public professionals was more 
successful, particularly in Canada. For instance, I corresponded with or interviewed: 
the Canadian MP who represents the riding with the largest Tamil population in 
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Canada; a former Canadian Minister of State for Asia-Pacific; Canada’s former 
Official Opposition Foreign Affairs Critic who also led Canada’s involvement in the 
early 2000s in the ceasefire negotiations between Sri Lanka and the LTTE, and; two 
British MPs, of whom one represents in his constituency one of the largest Tamil 
populations in Britain. I would have preferred to have interviewed more British MPs, 
but I discovered that unlike in Canada, there is stricter parliamentary protocol in 
Britain about engaging the constituents of other MPs, which I found deterred MPs 
from agreeing to interviews with me. Also, the differences in the level of each 
country’s concern with the Sri Lankan war may have influenced my ability to locate 
and engage policymakers who were themselves involved, knowledgeable or interested 
in the subject. I was unfortunately unsuccessful in engaging any pertinent bureaucrats 
or political staff directly on the issue in either country. I did pursue several leads in 
this regard, but I discovered that the turnover of political staff is high and that 
navigating central and federal bureaucracies for the current location and contact 
information of staff who have since moved on to new roles is challenging to say the 
least. 
I was more successful in securing a more representative sample with regard to 
individual community members in both countries. I corresponded with one Sinhalese 
student living in Britain, and the remainder were members of the Tamil communities 
in Britain and in Canada. Some of them were students, some were professionals, some 
were neither; some were civil war refugees while others were economic migrants; 
some had been out of Sri Lanka for several decades while others left Sri Lanka only 
recently. In other words, these interviewees ranged in terms of the various types of 
Tamil immigrants that are most commonly found in Britain and in Canada. While I 
was able to engage with many different Tamils willing to discuss their personal 
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experiences, all of them independently and specifically requested anonymity as a 
condition of corresponding or speaking with me, due to the sensitive nature of the 
project’s subject matter and the personal risks they could potentially face going on 
record about anything politically related to Sri Lanka.11  
It is of course very well possible that this sample was not representative of the 
larger community and that some biases were present among the interviewees. For 
instance, given the politically charged nature of the war, it is possible that 
interviewees exaggerated their stories and claims. Also, ten individual community 
members is quite a small number of people to correspond with to get a truly definite 
accurate picture of the experiences and perspectives of the greater communities. 
However, given the range of Tamil people I corresponded with and the freedom their 
anonymity in this project gave them to speak honestly and unreservedly about their 
experiences, I do feel that it would be fair to conclude that the sample likely gives at 
least somewhat of a glimpse into the experiences and views of the members of the 
larger communities, and that future further research would be beneficial to test this 
supposition.  
                                                 
11 Where relevant, references to these interviews are included within the text of this thesis as well as in 
Appendix 2 with information appropriate to the context, where I refer to them individually only with 
regard to the type of immigrant category they fall under, which country they reside in, the year and 
month that I corresponded to them, and the method with which I corresponded to them.   
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CHAPTER FOUR 
Case Studies: Evidence and Analysis 
 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to assess my explanations against my case studies. To 
do so, I begin by explaining the relevant history of the civil war that Sri Lanka has 
faced over the past several decades and its emigrants. I then look at the situations that 
were present in the UK and in Canada in relation to each country’s Tamil diaspora 
and foreign policy agenda regarding the Sri Lankan war. After that, I examine the 
primary explanation and the alternative explanation against the findings from each 
case study, weighing the evidence surrounding the effect that each diaspora had on 
each country’s respective foreign policy agenda.  
 
4.1 The Context in Sri Lanka: the Civil War and the Diaspora 
Sri Lanka’s twenty-six year long civil war between the Sri Lankan government and 
the LTTE was one of the most brutal and devastating conflicts in South Asia’s recent 
history. It cost tens of thousands of lives and prompted hundreds of thousands of 
people, overwhelmingly from the country’s minority Tamil population, to leave the 
country.  
 The history of the small island country located just off the southern tip of India 
and its horrendous civil conflict is one that was in many respects rooted in history 
from centuries past. After occupation by the Dutch and Portuguese, the British came 
to rule the country in 1815 and Ceylon, as it was then known, became an English-
speaking Christian colony. It was a diverse population made up of Buddhist Sinhalese 
people who constitute the majority, as well as other minority groups, including the 
Tamil population, a people defined by a common language and ethnic history. 
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 In the shadow of India’s independence movement and its own history of 
struggle for self government, Ceylon achieved independence in 1948, but faced a 
mountain of issues to be resolved pertaining to ethnicity, identity, borders and power 
sharing. After centuries of foreign occupation, majority rights were enshrined legally 
to the dismay of the minority Tamil population. Tamils were seen as having been 
favoured by the British, as they were at this time disproportionately more educated, 
better employed, and generally better off than most Sinhalese people. Sinhala became 
the official language, and Buddhism the official religion, despite both peaceful and 
violent agitations from the Tamil minority. Tamils were eventually barred or excluded 
from university programs, government jobs, and in many cases from holding public 
office.  
Prior to 1948, British colonial rulers set up English speaking and curriculum 
based schools in the north of the country, continuing on the traditions set forth by 
earlier Christian missionaries, which exposed and oriented the predominantly Tamil 
population there to western ideas and institutions (International Crisis Group 2010, 2). 
Given their educational background, many Tamils emigrated to Britain and its 
colonies for higher educational opportunities, and jobs in the Ceylon civil service and 
colonial administration (Valentine 1996, 155), although at this time, few Tamils 
moved abroad permanently due to strong bonds with their home communities 
(International Crisis Group 2010, 3). After 1948 when discriminatory policies against 
the Tamils and other minorities began to appear and come into effect in Sri Lanka, 
Tamils had fewer incentives to stay in Sri Lanka, and for those already abroad, fewer 
incentives to return home.  
 Spates of violent unrest and entreaties by the Tamil minority against the 
institutionalized discrimination they faced marred the 1950s and 1960s in Ceylon. In 
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the 1970s, the LTTE emerged in response to the discrimination and oppression Tamils 
experienced. It became a powerful violent force in the country, seeking the creation of 
an independent homeland in the north and north-eastern part of Sri Lanka, a region it 
named “Tamil Eelam.” Meanwhile, the Sinhalese government became more 
nationalist, more brutal in its tactics, and more hostile in its suppression of uprisings. 
The LTTE demanded a separate Tamil state led by the LTTE alone, and the 
government refused to concede to any real form of a federalist state with shared 
power.  
In July 1983, the LTTE killed 13 soldiers by ambushing a military convoy 
outside of the town of Jaffna, in the predominantly Tamil populated northern area of 
Sri Lanka. Supported by various deliberate government actions and inactions, anti-
Tamil mobs killed between a few hundred to several thousand people in retaliation, 
and burned and destroyed tens of thousands of Tamil homes and businesses. This 
episode known as Black July is often cited as the event that sparked the civil war. It 
set off a large wave of Tamils to leave the country to places where their skills, 
education and knowledge might be considered to be valuable assets and where there 
were already large established Tamil communities such as Malaysia, Singapore and 
England, as well as to other places like Canada and India with British-based cultures 
where they were able to seek refugee status with some ease.  
Over the next few years the conflict intensified. The LTTE’s struggle 
degenerated into brutal guerrilla warfare against virtually anyone who opposed the 
LTTE, from the Sri Lankan government and Sinhalese civilians, to moderate Tamils. 
At the same, the group developed into a sophisticated, well-armed militia. Over the 
course of the war, the LTTE was in frequent control of territory in north-east Sri 
Lanka, engaging in fierce confrontations with the Sri Lankan military in the 
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process. The group became notorious for pioneering the suicide bomber and for 
violent actions as extreme as recruiting and using child soldiers, the “ethnic 
cleansing” of the Sinhalese and Muslim population from areas under its control, and 
engaging in sea piracy, arms smuggling and political assassinations.  
In 1987, thousands of Indian troops were deployed to Sri Lanka to keep peace 
based on resolutions agreed to by the Sri Lankan President and Indian Prime Minister. 
It was in India’s interest to help end the civil turmoil its neighbour was facing, given 
India’s close proximity to the Tamil dominated areas of Sri Lanka and its own Tamil 
population’s empathy for their Sri Lankan Tamil cousins who were largely situated 
just a few dozen kilometres away across the Palk Strait from the Indian subcontinent 
and state of Tamil Nadu in the north of Sri Lanka. India agreed to end support for the 
Tamil separatist movement and recognise the unity of Sri Lanka, and the Sri Lankan 
government agreed to a devolution of power to the provinces, a merger of the 
primarily Tamil northern and eastern provinces subject to referendum, official status 
for the Tamil language, and withdrawing Sri Lankan troops in the north, with the 
caveat that the Tamil rebels surrender their arms. Importantly however, the LTTE, nor 
any Tamil group, was party to the talks.  
While the LTTE agreed to the terms of the accord at the outset, active 
confrontation quickly flared. Despite support for the Indian army’s presence from 
within some factions of the Tamil population, the LTTE opened fire on the Indian 
army killing hundreds amid reports of attacks against Tamil civilians at the hands of 
the Indians. Soon afterward, the Sri Lankan government asked India to leave. In 1991, 
the LTTE assassinated Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi, sparking severe 
condemnation and denunciation of the group by the Indian government and many 
governments around the world.  
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LTTE funding and resources had been mostly supplied by Tamils residing 
outside Sri Lanka, procured through an extremely sophisticated international support 
network and fundraising machine.12 While some funding had been produced freely 
from donors who genuinely supported the LTTE mission, a significant portion had 
also been acquired through criminal activities, such as sea piracy, human 
trafficking, and drug trafficking, as well as, most notably, intimidation, extortion 
schemes and physical violence aimed at the Tamil diaspora.13 The main location for 
LTTE fundraising activities had largely been western countries where there are large 
Sri Lankan Tamil communities, most notably Canada and the UK (Human Rights 
Watch 2006, 1). In fact, it was well-known that the International Secretariat of the 
LTTE was located in East London until the group with named a terrorist organization 
by the UK in the year 2000.  
In the 1990s, as the LTTE matured into a large and mobilized organization, 
LTTE activities outside of Sri Lanka began to garner the attention of international 
governments and provoke action with the goal of undermining them, beginning with 
its neighbour and former ally India. Following the LTTE’s assassination of its Prime 
Minister, India banned the group in 1992 under its Unlawful Activities (Prevention) 
Act of 1967 (Times of India 2010). Under the act, the government is allowed to 
impose restrictions for named groups on their freedom of speech and expression, right 
to assemble peaceably and without arms, and right to form associations or unions. The 
                                                 
12 For more detailed information on this advanced support network see for instance: Economist 2000; 
Van Hear 2001; Human Rights Watch 2006.  
13 In a wide array of reports, the LTTE has been accused of threatening individuals and business 
owners outside of Sri Lanka to give money in different ways using several techniques, such as going 
house to house demanding significant sums of money, from $2500 to $5000 for individuals, and 
upward of $100,000 from business owners, as well as demanding smaller monthly donations, and 
following and intimidating people who move house or arrive in a given country from Sri Lanka. One 
former LTTE volunteer in London indicated to Human Rights Watch that in the late 1990s, more than 
1000 individuals were making monthly donations to the London LTTE office (Human Rights Watch 
2006). Individuals who refused to give money were reportedly threatened or had threats made against 
their family at home or in Sri Lanka. For more information on reported LTTE fundraising and extortion 
tactics, see for example: Wayland (2004); Human Rights Watch (2006); Fair (2007); Giustozzi (2008).   
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United States was the next country to hamper the activities of the group, first by 
designating it as a Foreign Terrorist Organization by the State Department in late 
1997, roughly a year after more than 100 were killed, including two Americans, in an 
attack on Sri Lanka’s central bank in Colombo (International Crisis Group 2010, 6). 
The designation has the consequences of freezing the funds of, denying entry into the 
country for members of and making it criminal to provide money to such groups. 
Directly following 9/11, the US then listed it as a Specially Designated Global 
Terrorist along with several other groups, which has the more extreme effect of not 
only freezing the assets of the group, but also those of any one or any group that 
provides support to the named group or their associates in any way. The LTTE was 
designated in Britain a Proscribed Terrorist Group in 2001, under the Terrorism Act 
2000. Under this legislation, law enforcement is given extended powers such as to 
detain without charge, stop, search and seize property on named groups in order to 
more easily facilitate arresting, charging and prosecuting them. It also makes 
collecting or storing information or possessions relating to the purpose of carrying out 
a terrorist act a serious offence punishable by a prison term of up to ten years.  
Especially in the wake of 9/11, being declared a terrorist group by India, the 
US and the UK dramatically hampered the LTTE’s operations and reputation around 
the globe (Rae 2010, 188-189). In addition, around this time there were growing ties 
between the government of Sri Lanka and international military powers such as Israel 
and the US that threatened the LTTE’s relative power against the Sri Lankan army. 
For instance, in the year 2000, the Israeli government established full diplomatic ties 
with Sri Lanka and suggested that this development could lead to arms sales to 
Colombo (BBC News 2000). Also, according to Jeffrey Lunstead, US Ambassador to 
Sri Lanka and Maldives 2003-2006, Richard Armitage’s confirmation as Deputy 
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Secretary of State in March 2001 and his own personal interest in Sri Lanka and its 
domestic conflict set off an enhanced engagement strategy between the two 
governments (Lunstead 2007). The relationship led to increased financial backing of 
the Sri Lankan government from the US, such as increased security assistance 
designed to “send a message to the LTTE that a return to war would not yield 
benefits” (Lunstead 2007, 6). 
Facing dwindling funds and building international pressure on groups deemed 
to be terrorists, as well as a possible growing Sri Lankan government military 
capability, a ceasefire was declared in December 2001 initiated by the LTTE, after 
two decades of fighting and several failed attempts at peace talks. The LTTE ceasefire 
was reciprocated by the Sri Lankan government quite promptly after the LTTE’s 
announcement. The results of the 2001 elections in Sri Lanka produced for the first 
time in the country’s history a President and Prime Minister that represented two 
different parties, with contrasting views on how to resolve the civil conflict plaguing 
the country. Prime Minister Wickremasinghe’s United National Party was more 
moderate and favoured a federalist solution, while radical and Sinhalese nationalist 
factions within President Kumaratunga’s party and its circle of allies distrusted the 
LTTE and were very resistant to compromising with them. This political discord in 
Colombo was problematic and ultimately dysfunctional but as a result, it engendered 
an overall softer approach to the conflict, at least temporarily.  
In addition to the realities of the anti-terrorist mood in the international 
community at the time and the political situation is Colombo, peace negotiations were 
possible largely because of extraordinary efforts made by Norway. The Norwegian 
government had decided to put international conflict resolution at the top of its 
foreign policy agenda (Rae 2010, 189) and in turn dedicated significant resources 
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toward the situation in Sri Lanka, which earned the trust of both sides.14 In early 2002, 
the Sri Lankan government and LTTE met in Oslo and formalized the ceasefire with 
an agreement as a means of reaching a negotiated solution to the country’s conflict. 
As a basic tenet of the agreement, an international monitoring mission led by Norway 
and staffed by personnel from the Nordic countries was established as a means of 
observing its implementation and any instance of violation of the agreement’s terms 
and conditions.  
There was relative peace in Sri Lanka for the next couple of years but peace 
talks broke down in 2003, and the conflict began to intensify, even despite the 
devastating effects of the tsunami disaster of December 2004 that in other tsunami-
ravaged countries like Indonesia led to better cooperation between feuding parties 
(Hyndman 2010). Subsequent elections in Sri Lanka after the 2001 election led to 
governments that took a harder and harder line to the LTTE and the war, and while 
some factions within the LTTE became increasingly interested in a compromising 
approach, its leader Velupillai Prabhakaran fundamentally seemed to remain 
staunchly separatist and unwilling to make any genuine concessions (Rae 2010). In 
late 2005, a government was elected in Sri Lanka that ultimately sought an all-out 
military solution to the civil war, which likely happened ironically, because 
Prabhakaran ordered the Tamil population to abstain from voting in the election 
(Taylor, Jerome 2009; Krishan 2009).  
In 2008, the Sri Lankan government formally withdrew from the ceasefire 
agreement and with the support of India, Pakistan and Iran, it successfully fought and 
defeated the LTTE in a brutal show-down over the first half of the next year. After 
months of increasing fighting in the areas controlled by the LTTE, the Sri Lankan 
                                                 
14 For a descriptive explanation of Norway’s priorities and history regarding contributing to 
international peace and reconciliation efforts as a long-term foreign policy strategy, see for instance: 
Støre 2010; Dobinson 2004.  
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military declared a 32 square kilometre Safe Zone in the area in early 2009 and 
dropped leaflets from aircraft and passed on word via the International Red Cross that 
civilians should relocate there, promising not to fire into the area (BBC News 2009a). 
However, only small numbers of civilians actually crossed into the Safe Zone, likely 
because, as Human Rights Watch (2009) accused, the LTTE prevented civilians from 
leaving the war zone. As a result, fighting in the safe zone ensued, eventually 
prompting civilians to flee. The Sri Lankan military declared a new 10 square 
kilometre Safe Zone three weeks later, but over the next few months, it was 
repeatedly attacked by aircraft in order to crush remaining LTTE operatives hiding 
within it among the civilians.  
Eventually, 300,000 people in the area were transferred to “rehabilitation 
centres” (Human Rights Watch 2010) to root out the last remnants of the LTTE. The 
centres were essentially detention camps, where inhabitants were unable to leave, 
despite insufficient provisions for the people being held within them (Amnesty 
International 2009). By late spring, the Sri Lankan army and its allies had killed or 
captured the entire LTTE leadership and the Sri Lankan government took power over 
the previously LTTE controlled areas of the country. The war was declared to be over.  
Human rights groups accused both government and LTTE forces of 
deliberately targeting civilians during the last few months of the fighting and have 
estimated that thousands of civilians were killed and tens of thousands were injured 
during this time. A full year later, as of May 2010, there still remained 80,000 people 
held in the camps (Amnesty International 2010), presumably accused of having ties to 
the LTTE. The details of what precisely happened during the last months of the war 
are difficult to ascertain because the Sri Lankan government expelled journalists, 
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humanitarian workers and UN officials from inside the areas where the battles were 
being fought.  
 
4.2 British Tamils and Britain’s Policy Agenda 
Tamils from Sri Lanka in Britain are a diverse group, with an array of backgrounds, 
histories and experiences as immigrants. They have had a presence in Britain for more 
than a century, although with an advertising campaign to recruit Commonwealth 
settlers to rebuild Britain after WWII coupled with pro-Sinhalese policies emerging in 
Sri Lanka after Sri Lanka’s independence in 1948 from Britain, the post-war period 
saw its first large wave of Tamils immigrating to the UK permanently. At this time, 
many Tamils began arriving in Britain in search of economic and educational 
opportunities that were on the decline for them in Sri Lanka after discriminatory 
nationalist policies started to be put into place that limited their job and educational 
prospects (Van Hear 2009, 182). When nationalist policies were widely established in 
the 1960s in Sri Lanka, such as making Sinhalese the sole official language, a second 
wave of Sri Lankan Tamil migrants entered Britain (Pirouet 2001). With a large 
population of Tamils already in the UK, the outbreak of the civil war in July 1983 
spurred a third wave of Tamil refugees migrating to Britain. While “there are no 
official statistics on the numbers of Tamils in the UK” (United Kingdom 2009, 38), 
estimates of the population in Britain at the end of the civil war vary from between 
100,000 and 200,000.  
Tamils of the first two waves tended to secure professional positions in Britain 
in the public sector and other white collar professions, while subsequent Tamil 
migrants ventured into other employment avenues, especially small businesses like 
retail (Van Hear, Pieke and Vertovec 2004: 16). These differences reflect the 
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educational and professional opportunities that were available for Tamils at different 
times in Sri Lanka, which as described earlier, began to change and diminish 
dramatically after 1948. 
 Despite the assorted experiences and backgrounds possessed by the members 
of the British Tamil community, it is one defined by a high degree of social capital, 
demonstrating a well-connected and integrated kinship group. As Tamils settled 
throughout the UK, a wide variety of Tamil institutions and organizations were set up 
from Tamil media and Tamil-owned businesses to temples and churches and service 
organizations. This is particularly true in London which is home to areas with high 
concentrations of Tamils (Human Rights Watch 10). For instance, in the London 
Borough of Newham on the East Ham High Street alone there are over 100 Tamil-
owned businesses (interview with Sathianesan 2010; email correspondence with 
Timms 2010). There is at least one free daily UK Tamil newspaper called Puthinam, 
and one free UK Tamil weekly called Oru Paper. One international Tamil directory 
website, tamilbizcard.com, lists 58 different types of Tamil businesses in the UK and 
586 Tamil businesses over all that vary from accident insurance claims companies to 
wedding hall and banquet businesses. It is important to note however that despite the 
interconnectedness of the community, members are somewhat physically dispersed 
throughout the country. While Tamils largely do live in London, earlier Tamil 
migrants to the UK are more widely distributed throughout the country (Van Hear, 
Pieke and Vertovec 2004: 16).  
One of the Tamil immigrants I interviewed indicated to me that many Tamils 
who are students or professionals plan to return to Sri Lanka in the near future, even if 
they gain British citizenship, and accordingly, they keep up their business and 
scholarly networks in Sri Lanka. This observation was backed up by secondary 
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sources of information I consulted: according to one international Tamil newspaper, 
the flow of people between the Tamil areas of Sri Lanka and Britain for family visits, 
holidays and for study and business is steady and continual (Tamil Guardian 2010). 
According to the British government, there are more than 30,000 visa applications 
received by the British High Commission in Colombo every year for travel to the UK, 
and more Britons visiting Sri Lanka as tourists than any other nationality: each year 
between 60,000 and 80,000 British nationals visit Sri Lanka (United Kingdom 2010a).  
These findings indicate that a significant portion of the diaspora is made up of 
migrants who may have left Sri Lanka because of flagging opportunities but who still 
plan to make a life there irrespective of the political situation.  
One Tamil interviewee who works as an academic in the UK pointed out to 
me that even if a Tamil personally holds critical views of the war in Sri Lanka or of 
the government there, “he will act very different in the UK” with regard to getting 
involved in speaking out against the political situation in Sri Lanka if he still holds a 
Sri Lankan passport and plans to return to Sri Lanka than those who do not have a Sri 
Lankan passport, or have no immediate plans to return to Sri Lanka because of 
implications such activity might have on them when they return to Sri Lanka. Another 
Tamil interviewee stated, “Tamils involved in political activity or any sort of protests 
against the Sri Lankan government are harassed if they go to Sri Lanka or they can’t 
go to Sri Lanka at all.” While all of my Tamil interviewees in Britain told me that 
they identify themselves as Sri Lankan Tamils and have been personally affected by 
the war, some suggested to me that for this reason they have not been involved in 
political matters so to not draw attention to themselves. 
As many humanitarian organizations have widely documented during the 
course of the war, returning to Sri Lanka was known to be very problematic for 
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Tamils. It has been well-reported that upon returning to Sri Lanka Tamils have often 
been threatened by government forces if they were found to be or suspected of being 
politically active against the government, and also that the LTTE identified Tamils 
from the west who returned to Sri Lanka and systematically pressured them or their 
families for funds when they arrived in LTTE controlled territories where many 
Tamils lived (see for example Human Rights Watch 2006, 2).  
A reflection that was apparent to me quite quickly in my interviews with 
Tamils living in Britain was that many of those who were professionals or students 
identified themselves as having been not very politically engaged with regard to the 
war in Sri Lanka. One even purposely lived away from the hubs of the Tamil 
community in London. This interviewee said that he stayed abreast of news coming 
out of Sri Lanka through friends and family back home, but did not engage very much 
with the community in London, opting to go to a church attended by non-Tamils for 
example. He stated that his motivation for living away from the Tamil community 
was to better learn the language and to get himself and his family more integrated into 
British society.  
By contrast, another Tamil who came to London as a refugee in 1985 with 
whom I spoke described having “a moral duty to Sri Lanka” (interview with 
Sathianesan 2010). Paul Sathianesan has been a local councillor since 1998 for the 
borough of Newham in East London where a large concentration of Sri Lankan 
Tamils live, and he has been very involved in London’s Sri Lankan Tamil community 
since arriving in the UK in 1985. He identified that in reference to being torn between 
their home in the UK and homeland in Sri Lanka, many Tamils in Britain have “one 
foot here, one foot there.” Despite this however, he said that his impression is that the 
Tamil community in Britain is only broadly unified politically. Indeed, with reference 
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to their study of the British Tamil diaspora, Daniel and Thangaraj (1995) suggests a 
tension in this regard between the different migration cohorts.  
When I asked Sathianesan about strategies and successes of the Tamil 
community lobbying the British government since he arrived in the UK in 1985, he 
answered that while he thinks there are between 200 to 300 Tamil groups in the UK, 
“no single organization represents Tamils interests in the UK,” and that only a few 
have actually been very active in this, or any regard. In my research to determine the 
validity of this perception, I found that while there are nominally many Tamil 
organizations within the community as Sathianesan suggested, as demonstrated by 
their names being referenced in at least one place online or in a phone book, few have 
web presence such as its own website, or references to information about how to 
contact the group, who runs it or what the group does. I found that many of the web 
references that included such information or links to the information were not valid or 
broken.  
After the LTTE came to be seen as a terrorist group by the UK and other 
members of the international community in the late 1990s, many Tamil groups in 
Britain ceased from operating at least openly. For instance, two of the most high 
profile groups at this time who were active in the UK either disbanded or went 
underground, as a result of being accused of supporting the LTTE, or possibly for fear 
of becoming so, and the repercussions of this. The Tamil Rehabilitation Organization, 
which had operations in more than ten countries including the UK and which actively 
fundraised in all sorts of Tamil fora all over the world to provide support to Tamil war 
refugees and natural disaster victims in Tamil areas of Sri Lanka, was identified to be 
affiliated with the LTTE by the UK government and soon after retreated from public 
view in the UK. While it had NGO status in Sri Lanka and operated in government 
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run areas of the country until 2005, the group was delisted in the mid 2000s by the 
UK Charity Commission, accused of having little control over money sent to Sri 
Lanka for relief efforts and for liaising with the LTTE to make decisions about where 
funds should be spent (International Crisis Group 2010, 6; BBC News 2007). 
Similarly, the United Tamils Organisation, perhaps the most active Tamil group in the 
UK in the mid-late 1990s effectively disappeared after the LTTE was proscribed a 
terrorist group in the UK. It was granted permission three times to protest in a Royal 
Park in the UK between May 1 1997 and December 31 1999 (United Kingdom 
2000b), the only Tamil group to have ever been allowed to do so, and it organized a 
pro-LTTE protest march in 1998, the day before Prince Charles left for Colombo to 
celebrate Sri Lanka’s fiftieth independence anniversary, which was attended by 5,000 
British Tamils through the streets of London to “protest against the Sri Lankan 
government” (BBC News 1998) and to “mark fifty years of oppression by Sinhala Sri 
Lankan governments” (Tamilnet 1998). An editorial in an anti-LTTE online 
newspaper reported that the United Tamils Organisation, which it accused of being an 
LTTE front organization, disbanded shortly after the LTTE was listed in the UK as a 
result (Asian Tribune 2006). Indeed, today it not possible to locate or contact the 
group and public traces of it seem to disappear after the early 2000s.  
While evidence available on the activity of the Tamil community in Britain 
prior to 2001 to engage the public and policymakers is limited given that most groups, 
their websites, and their publically available contact information disappeared after the 
LTTE was listed in the UK as a terrorist organization, and while many individuals and 
groups were reluctant to agree to requests for interviews,15 it does appear that 
prominent groups such as the United Tamils Organisation and the Tamil 
                                                 
15 Several attempts by email, letter and telephone to contact the Tamil Rehabilitation Organization in 
Australia where it was active as recently as 2008 (and where the LTTE was not banned), as well as the 
British Tamils Forum, were unsuccessful.    
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Rehabilitation Organization were LTTE supporters and that they openly framed their 
issues as such. For example, in a 1998 protest the United Tamils Organisation 
attempted to negate the image of the LTTE as a terrorist group and paint the Sri 
Lankan government as the antagonist in the conflict, as a representative of the group 
at the event openly stated to the BBC. He said for example, “The Tigers are engaged 
in a co-ordinated armed struggle played out to international rules” (BBC News 1998). 
Also, images of LTTE leaders and Tamil Eelam flags and balloons were carried 
prominently throughout the march (Tamilnet 1998). The Tamil Rehabilitation 
Organization presented the Tamil cause in Sri Lanka as being legitimately fought by 
the LTTE, and it associated and engaged with the LTTE in its capacity as a de facto 
government delivering social services in LTTE controlled areas of the country.  
However, even before the LTTE was listed a terrorist group in the UK, prior to 
2001 the activity of the Tamil community in Britain to engage the public and 
policymakers was not exceedingly voluble or prominent. When asked about his 
impression about Tamil political activity in the UK and in his constituency prior to the 
end of the Sri Lankan conflict, MP Stephen Timms noted that while there was an 
increase in lobbying and political activity by Tamils as the climax of the conflict built 
up in early 2009, this degree of political engagement by the community was new to 
him based on his experience (email correspondence with Timms 2010), having been 
since 1994 MP of East Ham, a constituency which is home to thousands of Tamils in 
Britain and where the LTTE ran its International Secretariat from until the year 2001. 
Prior to the LTTE proscription as a terrorist group in the UK, when its inclusion was 
publically being discussed and considered in Britain after the Terrorism Act 
2000 came into force, vocal opposition from within the British community was not 
very observable. In fact, the BBC reported on protests from Tamils in Sri Lanka 
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urging the United Kingdom not to ban the LTTE, without any mention of dissension 
on the issue from within the community in Britain (see BBC News 2001). In short, 
while activity in the period before 2001 of the dominant groups and members of the 
community were pro-LTTE, it was not very prominent.  
Neither did it garner the attention of policymakers to the conflict or their 
support. While the British government publically condemned the civil war and 
atrocities being committed at the start of the conflict in Sri Lanka in the early 1980s, 
after the initial international attention that was drawn by the happenings of July 1983 
dissipated little in the way of discussion was actually occurring in policy circles or in 
the media until the issue of new British terrorist legislation began to develop late in 
the next decade. Indeed, a search in the British Hansard archives yielded a high of 147 
hits per year for the search term “Tamil” in 1985, and did not rise above 40 hits per 
year until the year 2000. Further, until a discussion about proscribing the LTTE a 
terrorist organization under new legislation emerged in the year 2000, most of the 
parliamentary discussion regarding the war in Sri Lanka was generally restricted to 
the very occasional updating of policymakers on various incidents that occurred 
throughout the war and public statements condemning the conflict, particularly the 
violence perpetrated by the LTTE, than any substantive policy debates or dialogues 
per se.  
For instance, in a 1995 “debate” on United Kingdom policy in South Asia, MP 
Nirj Deva stated:  
I must commend and congratulate President Chandrika Kumaratunga for her 
recent initiative in trying to bring peace to that troubled island. We thought 
that finally the situation had come under control and that there would be peace 
in the island, which should be one of the greatest economic miracles in south 
Asia. Sadly, however, it is not to be. On 19 April, the Liberation Tigers of 
Tamil Eelam unilaterally broke the ceasefire and started a war again. I know 
that my Hon. friend the Minister and my Right Hon. friend the Foreign 
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Secretary have condemned the LTTE for what happened. (United Kingdom 
1995).  
 
Similarly, MP Tony Baldry responded by affirming:  
We greatly welcomed President Kumaratunga's courageous commitment to 
seek peace by engaging the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam in political 
discussion… The cessation of hostilities on 8 January was warmly welcomed 
on the island and by all friends of Sri Lanka. That makes the LTTE's unilateral 
resumption of hostilities on 19 April profoundly regrettable. (United Kingdom 
1995).    
 
As early as 1995, the LTTE was being characterized on parliamentary record 
as a terrorist group (United Kingdom 1995; also see: United Kingdom 1996; United 
Kingdom 2000a for example), and in 2001 the LTTE was proscribed a Terrorist 
Organization by the British Parliament. However, even after this designation was 
made, not only was the war in Sri Lanka not on the policy agenda in Britain, but 
activities that were happening on British soil to support the war were not either. A 
study conducted by Human Rights Watch charges that despite calls from local Tamils 
to police about being harassed and threatened by LTTE members for funds, little was 
done by police as a result of the LTTE not being a priority for policymakers and in 
turn there was a lack of resources toward fighting crimes perpetrated by them (Human 
Rights Watch 2006, 41-45). One London Tamil surmised that, “The problem is that 
the police are not making efforts at a national/ metropolitan level to deal with the 
problem… [because] the government is more pre-occupied with Islamic extremism 
and they have not channelled resources to deal with the proscribed LTTE activities.” 
(Human Rights Watch 2006, 44). An inspector with the London Metropolitan Police 
substantiated this estimation by explaining: “We know that extortion is going on, but 
this is not a priority for the British government. When we look at what we need to 
concentrate our resources on, in terms of terrorist groups, we are focusing on Islamic 
groups” (Human Rights Watch 2006, 41).  
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Another example illustrating Britain’s lack of policy attention to the Sri 
Lankan war before its very end was that right after the end of the war, it came out 
publically that Britain granted export licences for British-made military equipment 
worth more than £13.6 million to be exported to Sri Lanka during the ceasefire period 
and the last few years of the conflict (Page 2009; Prince 2009). This occurred despite 
the 1998 EU Code of Conduct on Arms Exports, which restricts transfers to countries 
facing internal conflicts or with poor human rights records and a history of violating 
international law, as well as despite the fact that the US suspended all military aid and 
sales to Sri Lanka in early 2008 because of concerns about allegations of rights 
abuses. The approval for the licences in the UK seemed to have been an oversight 
rather than a specific policy decision: when this issue became public in early 2009, 
policymakers immediately expressed dismay. MP John Battle, former Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office minister and member of the Committee on Arms Export 
Controls, said: “We should have been sharper off the mark and so should the EU” and 
he called for an immediate suspension of EU arms sales to Sri Lanka until it lifted all 
restrictions on journalists and aid workers (Page 2009). A spokesperson for the 
Foreign Office responded to the news by saying that the government “shares 
concerns” about “military exports fuelling conflict in countries such as Sri Lanka” and 
that “As a result of the intensified fighting in Sri Lanka earlier this year, the 
Government launched a full review of export licensing decisions to Sri Lanka” 
(Prince 2009). In 2010, four House of Commons committees issued a joint report, in 
which it called for tougher scrutiny of arms export licences (see United Kingdom 
2010b, 53-54).  
For a few years after the LTTE was banned in the UK my findings suggest 
that there was very little public awareness activity being promulgated by the Tamil 
  59
community in Britain. When peace talks were in process in Sri Lanka after the 
ceasefire of 2002, most of my Tamil interviewees indicated to me that it provided 
much hope for many Tamils inside and outside of Sri Lanka at the time. Also, with 
the LTTE banned, supporting the LTTE was no longer seen to be as pressing as it 
once had seemed (Human Rights Watch 2006, 13). But as my British Tamil 
interviewees suggested to me, at that point many people were afraid to speak out 
about the war for fear of being labelled a terrorist or an LTTE supporter. In addition, 
while the LTTE may have still been operating underground, there was a void in the 
community in terms of organizational leadership to help galvanize and organize any 
such activity.  
However, as the end of the ceasefire agreement became more and more 
imminent, the Tamil community in the UK began to come together much more than it 
ever had previously and its concerns came to be somewhat reflected in the British 
policy agenda. As a return to full-scale hostilities in Sri Lanka began to take hold, 
vigils, protests, and campaigns attended and organized by Tamil community members 
in the UK became more commonplace and they increasingly began to be reported in 
the British media. Unlike before 2001 however, the messages being presented by the 
community at this time did not justify the cause of the LTTE and its often oppressive 
and violent tactics. The new messages were more toned-down, and more inclusive of 
and sensitive to the range of views and experiences of the Tamil community: while 
they continued to criticize the Sri Lankan government and declare Tamil rights to 
self-government, they centred on the need for peaceful resolutions in the country and 
for international support for human rights.  
Also a newly established national group, the British Tamils Forum, became a 
prominent feature during the last few years before the end of the Sri Lankan war in 
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Britain, helping to motivate and organize the community in the UK. It encouraged 
“democratic means… under pinned by the international law, covenants and 
conventions” to achieve its goal of realizing the Tamil national cause and the 
establishment of Tamil Eelam in the Northern and Eastern regions of Sri Lanka 
(British Tamils Forum 2009). While there are claims that the organization was started 
in 2006 as a new LTTE front group to replace the United Tamils Organisation as a 
leading national Tamil group for the UK (see Asian Tribune 2006 for instance) and 
while the group was similarly critical of the Sri Lankan government and its historical 
treatment of the Tamil people, its messaging and activities were almost entirely 
devoid of any reference to the LTTE or its characteristic violent stratagem, unlike the 
messaging that was advanced by the United Tamils Organisation.  
In the final year before the end of the war, the activity of the Tamil community 
in the UK became very visible, more than ever before, and quite specifically peace-
seeking and actively focused on garnering international support for the Tamil cause in 
Sri Lanka. It included, most notably, a march attended by 100,000 people in early 
April 2009 through the streets of London (BBC News 2009b) and lobbying by some 
members of Britain’s Tamil community to have the British government send an envoy 
to the UN to help secure peace in the country (interview with Sathianesan 2010). The 
Tamil message of seeking international help to end the Sri Lankan government’s 
violent repression of Tamils was even articulated directly to all government 
policymakers and the general public at the “Britain in the World Debate,” which was 
broadcast on national television, as part of the 2008 Labour Party Convention. In this 
forum, which was aired on BBC Parliament television September 22, 2008, leader of 
the British Tamils for Labour and British Tamils Forum member Sen Kandiah urged 
policymakers to “note with alarm the increase in violence and human rights violations 
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perpetrated by the Sri Lankan Government against Tamils” (British Tamils 
Forum 2008).   
Joining many other governments including Canada, France and the United 
States who had by this point made calls for peace in the country, the British 
government agreed to send former defence minister Des Browne as a Special 
Representative to the UN in New York for urgent talks on the war in Sri Lanka to try 
to secure a ceasefire between government forces and the LTTE. Then Foreign 
Secretary David Milliband suggested the move was a result of the Tamil community, 
as he stated: “The Tamil community are a community we value and they make an 
important contribution to British society. They have seen friends and relatives perish 
and their loved ones are still at grave risk from the fighting. We have heard their voice 
and will keep listening. We are committed to do all we can to bring this terrible 
conflict to an end.” (BBC News 2009b). 
 The war ended the next month, and by that point there was little else to be 
done to stop the Sri Lankan military onslaught against the LTTE and the civilians 
living in the north and eastern part of the country who were caught in the crossfire. 
However, a House of Commons Library report on the situation in Sri Lanka from 
June 2009, just after the war ended, clearly asserts: “Protests by the UK-based Tamil 
community began to have an increased impact on the British political scene during 
2009… [and that] this contributed to a marked number of debates on Sri Lanka in the 
House of Commons” (United Kingdom 2009, 38). Also notably, describing Britain’s 
past and present policy perspectives on the issue it states that while throughout most 
of the war, the UK’s policy was “hostile toward the LTTE” and that Sri Lanka was 
viewed by the UK as a trusted international ally, “if the current humanitarian crisis is 
resolved to satisfaction” the UK would support “future autonomy initiatives, provided 
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that they are sufficiently inclusive and reflect democratic principles” (United 
Kingdom 2009, 37).    
 
4.3 Canadian Tamils and Canada’s Policy Agenda 
The history of Sri Lankan Tamils in Canada is somewhat different from the history of 
Sri Lankan Tamils in Britain. Unlike the more diverse Sri Lankan Tamil population in 
the UK which is defined by several types of Tamil immigrants, the vast majority of 
Sri Lankan Tamils in Canada are refugees having fled the civil war. What attracted 
Tamils to Canada? It is impossible to know for sure but all of the Canadian Tamils I 
corresponded with for this project indicated that Canada’s immigration and 
multiculturalism policies and its reputation of openness to refugees were very 
attractive to them. David Poopalapillai, National Spokesperson for the Canadian 
Tamil Congress, expressed that “Canada’s reputable name around the world, when it 
comes to marginalized and expelled people” is what he feels to have been the main 
reason (interview with Poopalapillai 2010a). Indeed, many Tamils in Canada were 
accepted as refugees: before the start of the Sri Lankan civil war, Tamils had virtually 
no record in Canada, with less than 2000 Tamils living in Canada in 1983 when the 
war began (Aruliah 1994). Yet by 1999, Sri Lanka was the leading source of refugee 
claimants to Canada (Hyndman 2003, 251). 
Whatever the reason, Tamils in Canada make up one of the largest migrant 
communities in the country. In 2001, approximately one in four Sri Lankan Tamils 
lived outside of Sri Lanka, and one-third of that number settled in Canada. Estimates 
from 2006 put the Sri Lankan Tamil population in Canada between 200,000 and 
250,000 (Human Rights Watch 2006, 10). As a large, close-knit, growing community, 
they became concentrated in a few places in the country with Toronto becoming home 
to by far the largest concentration of the country’s Sri Lankan Tamils. Today Toronto 
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is an area with one of the largest concentrations of Sri Lankan Tamils outside of Sri 
Lanka.  
With similar pasts and shared stories of violence and discrimination, and the 
concentration of the population geographically, Tamils in Canada became quite a 
united immigrant community. Like in the UK, Sri Lankan Tamils in Canada during 
the war shared hostility and criticism toward the Sri Lankan government and the 
community as a whole was not supportive of the LTTE or what they stood for. But 
unlike in the UK, members of the community in Canada were more connected with 
one another by virtue of them mostly all being recent refugee migrants and possessing 
recent first hand knowledge of the injustices perpetrated against Tamils in Sri Lanka.  
In Winland and Wayland (2001)’s project on immigrant participation in 
Canadian civil society, most of their 16 Sri Lankan Tamils interviewees for their Sri 
Lankan Tamil case study were found to have kept very abreast of life and politics in 
their former country and to have felt that “the diaspora had a responsibility to try and 
influence Sri Lankan affairs” in some way (3). My own research for the Canadian 
case study of this project reflects these conclusions. All Tamil interviewees I 
corresponded with from Canada for this project acknowledged that while there are 
different viewpoints on the subject of homeland affairs in Sri Lanka, several said to 
me outright that they feel that no Tamil supports the Sri Lankan government with 
regard to the war. On the other hand, some impulsively told me that they do not 
support the LTTE, and that the Tamil plight was not terrorist in nature. While I found 
widespread disapproval among my interviewees for the violent tactics, methods of 
intimidation and uncompromising stances of the LTTE, the Tamils I corresponded 
with generally identified with the cause of fighting for Tamil equality against an 
oppressive and discriminatory government regime in Sri Lanka. One Tamil went so 
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far as to surmise that: “When it comes to the Sri Lankan government and the 
harshness and violence we faced, everyone has at least a little bit of Tiger in them.” 
The way David Poopalapillai put it was that: “The persecution faced by everyone 
unites them” (interview with Poopalapillai 2010a). 
Responses that I acquired from my interview with MP John McKay 
corroborate this deduction to some extent. Toronto area MP for the riding of 
Scarborough-Guildwood since 1997 which has one of the largest concentrations of Sri 
Lankan Tamils in the country, McKay told me that with respect to his experience and 
impression of the cohesiveness of the Tamil diaspora in Canada, concerns of Tamils 
regarding Sri Lanka are nuanced. He said that he is very familiar with the community 
and that despite their range of interests, almost all Tamils he has met with share 
terrible stories and experiences of oppression and many still have family and friends 
living the areas that were ravaged by the LTTE and the Sri Lankan army which affect 
their perspectives. He told me that, “There is no one voice. There is a range of people 
with different perspectives within the community who come to see me,” but he also 
pointed out that, “almost everyone has fled oppression” (interview with McKay 
2010).  
As the size of the Tamil community increased throughout the 1980s and 1990s 
with their shared histories and experiences, the community emerged as a large and 
strong choir of voices telling the story of the Sri Lankan civil war to each other, to 
Canadians and to Canadian policymakers. Tamil Canadians became quite active and 
vocal in this regard largely through information exchange to keep each other informed 
about Tamil issues in Canada, back home and abroad, and through public engagement 
and lobbying activity. 
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Connecting and servicing the community throughout Canada, the number of 
Tamil services and the amount of Tamil social capital in general is quite staggering. 
In Toronto as far back as the year 2000 there were ten weekly Tamil language 
newspapers, five of them free, four Tamil language radio stations, as well as three 
cinemas showing Tamil language films, and the largest Tamil video and music store 
in the world (Cheran 181-182). In Winland and Wayland (2001)’s case study of 
Canadian Sri Lankan Tamils, one-fifth of all online English-Language Tamil websites 
found were run from within Canada (3). As of 2010, there were at least three Tamil 
Canadian directories listing individual businesses, social services, and various 
political, cultural, and business organizations.  
Since 2005, there has even been an annual Tamil Studies Conference held in 
Toronto hosted jointly by the University of Toronto and the University of Windsor 
that contributes to the exchange of information about and within the Tamil 
community. With an overall objective examining and understanding Tamil culture 
without animosity in an apolitical fashion (Taylor, Lesley Ciarula 2009), the 
conference is organized with many specific goals in mind. Most notably, they include 
“strengthening the engagement of the Toronto Tamil community with both the 
University of Toronto and the academy of Tamil Studies scholars in North America” 
and to “make the Tamil diaspora an important subject of academic study and 
engagement” (Tamil Studies Conference 2010). With over 70 presenters in 2010, the 
conference has been spectacularly successful and in just a few years, it has become 
one of the foremost conferences of Sri Lankan scholars. 
 In addition to the vast information networks in the community, political 
demonstrations of the Tamil community in Canada have for years been a solid 
cornerstone of the diaspora’s activities in informing and engaging the Canadian public 
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and policymakers about the situation in Sri Lanka. Since the mid-1990s, Tamils have 
held many large protests in Toronto, Ottawa and other cities around the country that 
have very often been attended by notable community figures and politicians.  
Like the Tamil protests in the 1990s in the UK, protestors in Canada framed 
the Sri Lankan conflict in terms of pointing the finger at the Sri Lankan government 
and in justifying the separatist Tamil struggle and even at times the LTTE, but they 
also continually and predominantly highlighted the conflict as an issue in need of 
attention and action from the international community, and as something that Canada 
could relate to and assist with. For instance, a protest in July 1995 in Toronto attended 
by 15,000 people urged “the international community to recognize the struggle for 
freedom of their people in Sri Lanka” and featured prominently in the crowd the red 
with yellow tiger Tamil Eelam flag (Times – Colonist 1995), which is closely 
associated with the LTTE. At a candle light vigil held in Toronto that same weekend, 
a leaflet handed out said “17,000 government troops, backed by Sri Lankan air force 
bombers and naval ships, had launched a massive offensive against the Tamil people,” 
and that “the candlelight vigil is meant to draw the attention of the Canadian 
government and the Canadian public to the wanton killing of innocent people and 
destruction of property caused by the Sri Lankan military offensive, and to urge a 
political solution to the national conflict between the Tamil Nation and the Sinhalese 
Nation” (Millar 1995, A13). Mrugesapillai Duraiswamy, president of the Tamil 
Eelam Society of Canada, told the reporter at the event: “We want the Sri Lanka 
government not to be attacking the innocent public… steps must be taken by the 
international community to stop the violence” (Millar 1995). Signs carried by 
protesters at the event read: “Stop bombing and killing civilians” as well as “Canada 
open your eyes to Tamil suffering” (Millar 1995).  
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A few months later in November 1995, a demonstration of between 16,000 
and 20,000 people marched on the Ontario Legislature in Toronto to highlight the 
plight that Tamils were facing in Sri Lanka. Tony Ruprecht, then Member of 
Provincial Parliament for the riding of Parkdale-High Park, an area of Toronto 
historically known to be home to many refugees including many Tamils, addressed 
the crowd, imploring the Canadian federal government to help “stop the killing” and 
that the Sri Lankan government should, “Let the Tamil people determine their own 
future and structure their own destiny” (Levy 1995, A18). Another speaker, Vasantha 
Raja, former head of the Sinhalese Section of the BBC World Service, compared the 
Tamil plight in Sri Lanka to the situation in Quebec, by telling the reporter: “If the 
French people in Quebec had undergone a minute fraction of what the Tamil people 
had suffered under the Sinhalese government, the Canadian federation would have 
broken up a long time ago” (Levy 1995, A18). 
In 1998, at least 5,000 protestors attended a mass demonstration in Toronto on 
the 50th anniversary of Sri Lankan independence from Britain to protest the 
discrimination and violence Tamils have experienced at the hand of the Sri Lankan 
government (The Record 1998). However, unlike the similar protest held in Britain 
the day before Prince Charles left for Sri Lanka to celebrate Sri Lanka’s anniversary, 
organizers in Canada held an associated conference the next day featuring speakers 
and attendees from Harvard University, the US Institute of Peace and several 
Members of Provincial Parliament (Wayland 2004, 420).  
Most large Tamil events like ones described above were planned and 
organized by Tamil organizations. The groups have included the World Tamil 
Movement, the Federation of Associations of Canadian Tamils (FACT), the Tamil 
Eelam Society of Canada, the Canadian Tamil Congress (CTC), as well as various 
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Tamil student associations and other smaller Tamil groups. Many of those 
interviewed for this study stated that they and many of their friends and families use 
these events not to express solidarity with the missions of the groups organizing the 
events per se, but to voice their concerns about the war in Sri Lanka. As one Tamil 
interviewee told me, “We hear about events that are organized by groups like the CTC 
[Canadian Tamil Congress] and they’re opportunities to get together to express our 
views against what has been happening in Sri Lanka and that Canada and the world 
needs to get involved.”  
 Direct lobbying activity and political communications with politicians is a 
domain that has also been a major activity for the diaspora. As the numbers of Tamils 
to Canada increased appreciably since the 1980s and into the 1990s and as these 
refugee claimants became citizens and permanent residents, the Tamil diaspora 
evolved into quite a robust force in Canadian electoral politics. With a population 
concentrated in and around Toronto, there are just a few federal constituencies to 
which Tamils belong. As a result, only a handful of MPs receive the bulk of the 
communication made by Tamils in their constituency work. However, given the 
Tamil population’s geographic concentration as well as its over all size, Tamils and 
their issues can stand out to MPs who have large Tamil populations within their 
constituencies, as they have for MPs like John McKay (interview with McKay 2010).  
In January 2002, when MP Bill Graham was made Minister of Foreign 
Affairs, his constituency of Toronto Centre (then called Toronto Centre-Rosedale) 
was home to thousands of Tamils, and according to Cheran (2003) at least 6,000 
eligible Tamil voters (10). As the new Foreign Affairs Minister held the riding’s seat 
since 1993, he was likely a great deal aware of the issues facing Tamils and the war 
raging in Sri Lanka.  
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In addition to communications with MPs, Tamils have been known to 
participate in federal politics in other ways, such as getting involved in leadership 
races with the Liberal Party of Canada. For instance, political leaders such as Paul 
Martin, a cabinet minister who was seen as a favourite to succeed Prime Minister 
Chrétien years before Chrétien stepped down, is known to have been courted by the 
Tamil community, and to have attended many high profile Tamil events such as 
FACT’s May 2000 Tamil New Year Gala dinner (Wayland 2004, 421). During the 
federal Liberal Party leadership race of 2003, the Tamil community in Ontario elected 
86 Liberal Party delegates supporting the leadership of the soon-to-become new 
Prime Minister Paul Martin from a total of 1434 Ontario delegates, outnumbering the 
total number of delegates elected respectively in two provinces and each of the 
territories (Cheran 2003, 11).  
Even while Canadian officials continued to receive damning reports and 
updates about the LTTE from police and security experts like the RCMP and CSIS 
(see for instance: Chalk 1999; Canada 1999; Canada 2000), Canada’s government 
possessed a different kind of policy agenda with regard to Sri Lanka than the UK, as it 
embodied a subtle but sensitive and nuanced attitude toward the country and the 
issues it was facing. Actual public policy debate in Canada was rather quiet on the 
subject of Sri Lanka during the war, even while Canada’s closest allies were in the 
process of naming the LTTE a terrorist organization and during the lead up to the 
2002 peace process. For instance, during the six year period between September 1997 
and September 2002, there were just 62 references to the search term “Tamil” in 
Canada’s Hansard. Despite this however, Canada’s actions in Sri Lanka denoted a 
policy agenda defined by genuine interest in a peace process and even some sympathy 
toward Tamil separatist aspirations.  
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 For instance, when David Kilgour was made Minister of State, Asia Pacific, in 
2002, the first country in his portfolio that he visited was Sri Lanka. That he did so 
was a point that he himself highlighted publically as meaningful and significant (see 
Kilgour 2003 for example). But the two most critical initiatives that Canada 
participated in with regard to Sri Lanka over the whole of the war were supporting the 
Forum of Federations as a representative of Canada in advising on the 2002 ceasefire 
agreement in Sri Lanka, and delaying listing the LTTE as a terrorist organization 
under Canada’s Anti-Terrorism Act, an act which permits the freezing and seizing of 
property belonging to listed entities and makes participating in, contributing to, or 
facilitating activities of a listed group a crime.  
While Norway played the central role in helping to facilitate the 2002 peace 
deal and its accompanying Oslo Peace Declaration, Canada also played an important 
function in helping to broker and support the agreement. Two prominent Canadian 
representatives spearheaded this work. One was David Cameron, a former Ontario 
Deputy Minister of Intergovernmental Affairs who worked on the Meech Lake 
Accord, who spent a large part of his career before politics working for the 
government on federalism issues and Quebec relations, and who now serves as Chair 
of the Political Science Department at the University of Toronto. The other was Bob 
Rae, the former Ontario Premier who currently sits as Liberal Interim Leader and who 
was for a time the Foreign Affairs Critic for the Official Opposition.  
Cameron and Rae held training sessions and advised both parties in Oslo prior 
to the Oslo Peace Declaration and they travelled extensively in Sri Lanka, meeting 
with both the government and LTTE negotiators many times during the monthly 
rounds of peace talks after the Oslo Declaration was signed. They did so under the 
auspices of the Forum of Federations, an independent international organization that 
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is partnered with several national governments to work to promote federalism in 
democratic societies. The federation as an organization was initiated in Canada with 
the assistance and financial backing of the Canadian government, and its specific role 
at the formal peace talks in Sri Lanka were directly supported by the Canadian 
government (Kilgour 2003).  
While Cameron and Rae’s activities in the negotiations were not official 
government activities per se, they acted as de facto representatives and delivered a 
contribution in the process that Canada was recognized for. Cameron and Rae were 
seen to be there as representatives of Canada by the negotiators. As Cameron 
explained to me, “GL Peiris16 made it clear that they were interested in us largely 
because we were Canadians” (email correspondence with Cameron 2010). The LTTE 
stated that they admired Canada’s system because it includes mechanisms for self-
determination, like the 1995 Quebec referendum on sovereignty (Hyndman 2004, 
252). The front page of the Globe and Mail proclaimed after the ceasefire agreement 
was signed: “Sri Lanka peace deal forged on Canada’s federal model” (Knox 2002). 
Indeed, Canada played a unique and different role in the peace process than the UK, 
and most other countries in the world. 
Canada’s decision to not quickly follow suit with the UK and the US in listing 
the LTTE as a terrorist organization was another critical policy decision that set 
Canada apart from the UK in terms of its agenda with regard to Sri Lanka. Canada’s 
Anti-Terrorism Act was put into place in December 2001, after the terrorist attacks in 
the US on September 11, 2001. The LTTE was promptly proscribed in the UK and the 
US under similar legislation, yet Canada waited until 2006 to proscribe the group.  
                                                 
16 Gamini Lakshman Peiris was the Sri Lankan government’s chief negotiator in the 2002 peace accord. 
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As Sri Lanka was at the table with the LTTE beginning a process of legitimate 
negotiation, it would have been inconsistent with the continued functioning of the 
peace process to have them listed as terrorists, and incompatible with Canada’s role in 
helping to facilitate it. As Cameron candidly told me: “One of the consequences of the 
US listing them was that the Americans could not talk to the LTTE; their ambassador 
in Colombo never had any dealings with them, whereas our High Commissioner 
travelled extensively to the Vanni17 and talked with them regularly. Had Canada 
listed, all that would have ended, as would have our role” (email correspondence with 
Cameron 2010). 
Unfortunately, the peace process eventually fell apart and successive 
governments elected in Sri Lanka were more and more hard-line towards the LTTE, 
despite Canadian efforts, and those from many other countries around the world, as 
noted at the beginning of the chapter. In 2006, Canada finally named the LTTE a 
terrorist organization under a new minority Conservative government that had been 
elected into office a few months prior. However, despite this, Sri Lanka’s war 
continued to be a concern for Canadian policymakers. 
Unlike in Britain, after the LTTE was proscribed a terrorist organization in 
Canada in 2006, many Tamil groups previously active in the community continued to 
function as active mobilizers of the community. While one group accused of being an 
LTTE front organization, the World Tamil Movement, was subsequently placed on 
Canada’s terrorist list in 2008 (Canada 2009a), other prominent groups like the Tamil 
Eelam Society of Canada, the Canadian Tamil Congress, the Federation of 
Associations of Canadian Tamils, and others continued to facilitate the expression of 
the Sri Lankan Tamil voice in Canada on Tamil issues. Leading up to the end of the 
                                                 
17 The Vanni refers to the mainland area of the Northern Province of Sri Lanka largely inhabited by 
Tamils and controlled for a long time by the LTTE.  
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war in spring 2009, many huge headline-grabbing protests which these and other 
Tamil organizations helped to organize (see Taylor, Lesley Ciarula 2009) were 
assembled to urge Canada and other powers to get involved in stopping the war in Sri 
Lanka. Perhaps the most notable was organized in May 2009 when thousands of 
expatriate Tamils from all around Canada descended and converged on Toronto and 
Ottawa to hold multi-day mass demonstrations to protest the military onslaught in Sri 
Lanka that at this point was killing hundreds of Tamil civilians and forcing countless 
more to flee the formerly LTTE run regions of the country and to urge Canada to get 
involved. At one point the protest in Toronto moved onto one of the country’s busiest 
highways, the Gardiner Expressway, capturing the country’s attention. The young and 
old alike, some with babies in strollers, sat for hours into the middle of the night on 
the Gardiner, before the protest moved to Queen’s Park (Marlow, Stancu and Baute 
2009).  In Ottawa, many MPs and their staff went to the protests to talk to the Tamil 
protestors and express solidarity with them on the need for Canada and the 
international community to press for peaceful resolutions in the country.18 And like 
many of its allies in the international community leading up to end of the war in 2009 
the Canadian government explicitly called on the Sri Lankan government for a 
ceasefire, which one MP, attributed to the efforts of members of the Tamil community 
for coming “to the Hill to give us a better understanding of the reality of the situation” 
(Canada 2009a).  
Not only did the issue stay on Canada’s foreign policy agenda after the LTTE 
was banned, but there was not a dominant concern in Canada of being labelled a 
“terrorist” or of being associated with the LTTE for engaging politically with the 
                                                 
18 As a Parliamentary Intern at the time, working in the Parliamentary office in Ottawa of MP Paul 
Dewar, then the NDP’s Foreign Affairs Critic, I personally witnessed the protests as well as the 
attendance to and conversations of many MPs and their staff with the protestors.  
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Tamil community against the conflict or even on issues or at events directly 
associated to the LTTE. The red Tamil Eelam flag emblazoned with a yellow tiger 
known for its association with the LTTE was being flown openly and repeatedly in 
many of the protests in Toronto and Ottawa during the months and weeks leading up 
to the end of the war.19 Many attendees and representatives of groups organizing the 
events openly talked about the LTTE and even some of the positive impacts the group 
has had in Sri Lanka (see for example Taylor, Lesley Ciarula 2009). When SP 
Thamilchelvan, the Chief Negotiator and second-in-command of the LTTE was killed 
by Sri Lankan military forces in 2007, a mass gathering to honour his life and death 
was held in a Toronto suburb and attended by thousands of people, including several 
MPs who even made speeches to the crowd about the need for continued dialogue in 
Sri Lanka and for action to facilitate it from the international community (Leong 
2007). MP Jim Karygiannis stated in his speech that he was there “to show solidarity 
with my constituents, both Sinhalese and Tamils” and of Canada’s decision to outlaw 
the LTTE, he said, “Unless we engage both sides, we're never going to have a lasting 
solution” (Taylor 2007). When the World Tamil Movement was named a terrorist 
group in Canada in 2008 for providing support to the LTTE, a large demonstration in 
a Toronto park was attended by thousands to protest the move as well as Canada’s 
earlier decision to name the LTTE. One of the speakers argued that Canada's decision 
to ban the LTTE “has to be challenged,” that they are a legitimate liberation 
movement and that Canada needs to recognize the LTTE-controlled areas in  Sri 
Lanka “as an independent state, called Tamil Eelam” (Bell 2008). In Parliament in 
February 2009 during an emergency debate in the House of Commons on the situation 
in Sri Lankan, one opposition MP openly and unapologetically acknowledged 
                                                 
19 I personally witnessed the flag being liberally flown at the Tamil protests in Ottawa in spring of 
2009. In Ciarula Taylor (2009) their presence and abundance in the Tamil protests in Toronto in 2009 
is also documented.  
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attending an event hosted by a Tamil organization that was directly accused by a 
Minister of State of having links to the LTTE (see for example Canada 2009a).  
 
4.4 Weighing the Primary and Alternative Explanations against the Findings 
 
In the previous chapter, I presented primary and alternative explanations to test 
against my findings for the case studies as well as indicators for each. I said that the 
primary explanation I would test would be that host country foreign policymakers are 
likely to place a diaspora’s home country policy issue onto the host-country foreign 
policy agenda as a result of diaspora electoral influence. I said that sufficient evidence 
of no electoral influence would include sufficient evidence indicating that host 
country policymakers placed a diaspora’s home country policy issue onto the host 
country’s foreign policy agenda and sufficient evidence that the diaspora did not 
represent a sizeable voting bloc, that the diaspora did not effectively rally voters to 
their cause, and that the diaspora did not significantly contribute to the political 
campaigns of key policymakers. The alternative explanation I presented in the 
previous chapter was that host country foreign policymakers are likely to place a 
diaspora’s home country policy issue onto the foreign policy agenda if the diaspora 
effectively promotes frames about the issue in ways that engage and appeal to 
policymakers. I said that sufficient evidence of no policymaker influence through 
effective diaspora framing would be sufficient evidence indicating that host-country 
policymakers placed a diaspora’s home country policy issue onto the host country 
foreign policy agenda and sufficient evidence to suggest that the diaspora was not 
mobilized, that it did not devise and promote frames to policymakers that were 
relevant to the given political opportunity structure, and that the policy agenda did not 
mimic specific key messages and ideas present in the frames.  
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4.4.1 Analysis of the British Case Study 
To begin, my analysis of the British case study regarding whether I found evidence to 
suggest that host-country policymakers placed a diaspora’s home-country policy issue 
onto the host-country foreign policy agenda is that the Sri Lankan war was placed 
onto Britain’s foreign policy agenda. This is demonstrated largely by the findings that 
the UK agreed to send a special envoy to the UN to try and secure peace in Sri Lanka 
near the end of the war, and by statements in a House of Commons Library report that 
declare that while the UK in the past had been hostile to the LTTE and trusting of Sri 
Lanka as an international ally, in future the UK would support future autonomy 
initiatives for Tamils in Sri Lanka on condition that they are based on principles of 
democracy and sufficiently inclusive.   
 Regarding the primary argument’s indicator of finding evidence to suggest 
that the diaspora was not a sizeable voting bloc, I did find the Sri Lankan Tamil 
diaspora in Britain to be considerable in size, comprising of between 100,000 and 
200,000 people, which would theoretically represent a credible size to influence the 
outcome of an election if members were to all vote in the same manner. 
Constituencies in large urban areas like London tend to have high populations and my 
research indicates that there is a large concentration of the diaspora in London. There 
is also a large proportion of the community that is spread out across the country. Thus 
in London and in other constituencies across the UK, the diaspora could potentially 
have swayed the results of an election. However the evidence suggests that the 
diaspora was not a credible threat in this regard or perceived as such. Because the 
diaspora was not mobilized for most of the duration of the war, it would have been 
apparent to any policymaker who got to the know the community that there was not 
much agreement in the community on the issue of the war, and thus the chances that 
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the diaspora would vote as a bloc on any activity taken by the government on the 
issue would likely have been perceived to be not high.  
 Similarly, the evidence I found regarding the primary argument’s indicator of 
whether the diaspora rallied voters to a cause suggest that the UK Sri Lankan Tamil 
diaspora did not do this. In the earlier years of the Sri Lankan war, the diaspora was 
not very active in public awareness campaigns. The community was not very 
politically cohesive during this time period and the make-up of the community was 
varied, as it comprised of many different types of migrants from economic and 
education migrants who had been in the UK for several years to migrants who had left 
Sri Lanka in order to flee the war. The pro-LTTE messaging that some groups 
campaigned on did not appear to garner the interest or support of the public, 
demonstrated by the little reporting in the media and discussion in parliament on these 
activities or the issue of the Sri Lankan war generally. During the last couple years of 
the war the diaspora became much more publically active as the portion of the 
diaspora representing refugee migrants grew, and the messaging put forth by the 
community appeared to be more consistent with the views of the Tamil diaspora more 
broadly and it received wider reception from the media as well as from policymakers. 
However the Sri Lankan war never became a hot-button election issue at least before 
the end of the war. While the diaspora’s protests at this time received wide media 
coverage, it did not signal that the public was deeply concerned about the issue. 
Rather, the media reported on the issue as something the diaspora cared deeply about.  
In terms of the indicator relating to whether the diaspora significantly 
contributed to the political campaigns of key policymakers, my research indicates that 
this was likely not the case. It is possible that some contributions were made, but 
making contributions to influence policymakers did not appear to be a principle tactic 
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undertaken or preferred by the diaspora. Encouraging substantial contributions to 
policymakers from within the diaspora community, developing relationships with 
policymakers and pushing for specific political favours in return entails a long term 
strategy. Several of my interviewees suggested to me that toward the end of the war 
Sri Lankan Tamils began to lobby policymakers more than in the past, but because the 
issue of the increasing violence in Sri Lankan was urgent the efforts of the community 
were urgent, and they predominantly centred on garnering immediate public attention 
and action in a dramatic fashion. Also, given the extortion many Tamils experienced 
at the hands of the LTTE, fundraising for political purposes was a method many 
Tamils had negative associations with.  
Also, a finding that applies to all of the electoral influence indicators is that 
the small window of time before the end of the war when the diaspora did mobilize 
was not very close to an election. The last election in Britain was in 2005 which was 
well before when the diaspora began to ramp up their public campaigns in 2008, and 
the election produced a majority Labour government (although the majority was 
reduced from 160 to 66 seats), which meant that the next general election would not 
likely be until mid-2010, as UK convention is that a general election must be called 
within five years of the last general election. As a result, an immediate threat of 
electoral influence was likely not present.   
In sum, the evidence I found in my British case study research with regard to 
the primary argument and its indicators suggests that the Sri Lankan war was on the 
British foreign policy agenda by the end of the war, that the diaspora represented a 
potential sizeable voting bloc although it also suggests that policymakers likely did 
not perceive it as a threat. The evidence also indicates that it likely did not sway the 
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public in this regard, and that it likely did not substantially contribute to the political 
campaigns of policymakers to influence the foreign policy agenda.  
With regard to the alternative argument, I found sufficient evidence of the first 
indicator in the UK case study that as mentioned above suggests that the issue of the 
Sri Lankan war was placed onto Britain’s foreign policy agenda. Evidence in this 
regard is demonstrated largely by the findings that the UK agreed to send a special 
envoy to the UN to try and secure peace in Sri Lanka near the end of the war, and by 
statements in a House of Commons Library report that declare that while the UK in 
the past had been hostile to the LTTE and trusting of Sri Lanka, in future the UK 
would support future autonomy initiatives for Tamils in Sri Lanka on condition that 
they are based on principles of democracy and sufficiently inclusive.   
 An indicator for the alternative explanation I identified was finding sufficient 
evidence to suggest the diaspora was not mobilized. My findings regarding this 
indicator were that Tamils in Britain for most of the duration of the Sri Lankan war 
were not mobilized but that they did mobilize in the lead up to the end of the war. I 
found that the network of Tamil services available to the community throughout the 
country helped serve as a mobilizing structure for the diaspora but that they were a 
people defined by varied personal experiences, who left Sri Lanka under several 
different circumstances who possessed varying future aspirations, and who had been 
removed from the goings-on in Sri Lanka for different periods of time. As a result, 
their political positions and how strongly they possessed them were extremely mixed. 
Some were refugees who were committed to change in Sri Lanka and avenging the 
violence the Tamil people faced at the hands of the Sri Lankan government, while 
others were less so, having come as educational and economic migrants who left Sri 
Lanka in part because of discrimination, but did not experience the same level of 
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oppression as more recent migrants. While some Tamils were committed to engaging 
politically to stop the war, many were not motivated to get involved in politics that 
were largely supportive of the LTTE out of fear of reprisals or because they were not 
fully behind the LTTE cause or both. Near the end of the war when the overtly pro-
LTTE groups retreated in the UK, when violence in Sri Lanka escalated and when 
new Tamil groups in the UK surfaced that emphasized principles that were 
incorporative of the broader British Sri Lankan Tamil identity, the diaspora 
mobilized. This is exemplified in the 2009 protest against the war in Britain which 
was attended by approximately 100,000 people.   
With regard to the indicator for the alternative explanation regarding finding 
sufficient evidence to suggest that the diaspora did not devise and present frames to 
policymakers that were relevant to the given political opportunity structure, I found 
that at the end of the war such frames were developed by the diaspora and promoted 
to policymakers. The frames presented by active members of the community before 
the LTTE was listed as a terrorist group were quite overtly pro-LTTE, as they 
legitimized the political goals of the LTTE movement and the group’s often violent, 
vicious and exceedingly obstinate tactics in the conflict, and they presented the civil 
war as a justified internal conflict, despite, or perhaps as a result of, the fact that in the 
1990s, the LTTE came to be increasingly condemned internationally and in Britain as 
a terrorist organization. Given the mixed backgrounds and perspectives of members of 
the Tamil community in Britain, which made for a more broad sense of collective 
identity within the community, it appears that these frames did not broadly appeal to 
members of the British Sri Lankan Tamil community, and as a result, did not motivate 
a huge amount of collective action within the community, even despite the success of 
sophisticated intimidation tactics carried out by LTTE operatives for support. While 
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the pro-LTTE frames were campaigned with by those active in the community, they 
did not appeal greatly to policymakers in Britain. The British foreign policy agenda 
with regard to the Sri Lankan war was almost non-existent throughout most of its 
duration. By the end of 1990s, Britain clearly leaned toward the side of the Sri Lankan 
government and its regime, culminating with the British government naming LTTE 
under the Terrorism Act 2000. In a way, the British Sri Lankan Tamil community 
itself served as an obstacle to success in engaging policymakers, being too disparate 
ideologically and uninterested to mobilize into an effectual politically engaged 
diaspora, and with its presentation of frames being heralded by principal groups at the 
time which were quite specifically supportive of the LTTE and not wholly 
representative or evocative of the views, priorities and experiences of the greater 
British Sri Lankan Tamil community or of British policymakers. To refer to 
theoretical language from the framing literature, consensus on who the protagonists 
and antagonists were from the first step in the framing process around diagnostic 
framing was not adequately fleshed out, and consequently neither was agreement 
regarding the subsequent steps of prognosis and motivational framing, which 
determine the proposed solutions to the problem and the justifications for action.   
After the dominant Tamil groups in Britain who had led the political activism 
of the community with pro-LTTE frames petered out, after the ceasefire was 
abandoned by the Sri Lankan government, and after new Tamil community leaders in 
Britain emerged, the community began to regroup, rebuild and reframe the issue of 
the conflict on newer broader terms which more members mobilized around, that 
were critical of the Sri Lankan government but that emphasized needing to find a 
peaceful resolution based on international norms with the assistance of the 
international community. While the Sri Lankan government remained the antagonist 
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in the diagnostic frame, the LTTE was replaced by the international community as the 
protagonist. The proposed solution of the prognostic frame was peace as opposed to 
crushing the Sri Lankan government, and the motivational frame hearkened to norms 
around democracy, international law and human rights rather than ideals of vengeance 
and the legitimacy of retribution.  
These new frames better reflected the collective experiences and viewpoints of 
the greater diasporic community, or their collective identity, and they were more 
appealing to policymakers and relevant to the existing political opportunity structure. 
They were still disparaging of the Sri Lankan government, but they were not blatantly 
supportive of LTTE tactics. They meshed with the concerns of the more hard-line 
members of the groups who had been more sympathetic to the LTTE, as they did not 
abandon the request for some form of Tamil autonomy in Sri Lanka, but they did so in 
a way that emphasized western norms that also appealed to other members of the 
diaspora, many of whom were well-educated and worldly businesspersons and 
professionals who were interested in securing peace in their homeland but not at the 
expense of aligning themselves with the LTTE in a bitter fight to avenge the violence 
and discrimination perpetrated by the government against the Tamils. They appealed 
as well to British policymakers and their western ideals of human rights, democratic 
governance and internationalism. Whereas the earlier pro-LTTE frames perhaps 
unsuccessfully attempted to transform frames possessed by policymakers and 
members of the diaspora about the legitimacy of violence and retribution, the new 
frames found common ground on the issue of the conflict, through frame extension by 
stretching the frames to incorporate and appeal to similar norms possessed by 
policymakers and those shared more broadly by more members of the diaspora. These 
frames meshed well with the political opportunity structure particularly in regard to 
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the revelation that the UK granted licences to export arms to Sri Lanka near the end of 
the war. When the news broke, the UK government expressed embarrassment. The 
frames promoted by the diaspora at this time were opportune as they provided a 
roadmap for policymakers to redeem themselves and affirm their disapproval of the 
recent actions being taken by Sri Lankan government and the way they were playing 
out the conflict.  
I said that the final indicator for the alternative explanation would be sufficient 
evidence to suggest that the policy agenda did not mimic specific key messages and 
ideas present in the frames. My findings were that the government policy agenda did 
replicate specific images and messages presented in the frames of the diaspora that 
were asserted at the end of the war. This was specifically demonstrated by two 
findings. The first finding was the June 2009 House of Commons Library report 
which stated that the UK would support future autonomy initiatives for Tamils in Sri 
Lanka that were based on principles of inclusion and democracy. Frames premised on 
the idea of autonomy for Sri Lankan Tamils founded on and for the purposes of 
inclusion, democracy and international law were repeatedly presented by the diaspora, 
particularly in the communications of the British Tamils Forum, one of the most 
dominant groups that popped up in Britain after the LTTE was proscribed. The second 
finding was the UK government’s decision to send a special envoy to the UN to help 
quell the violence that had escalated in Sri Lanka. Accordingly a local councillor in 
London I interviewed, this request was made specifically by the Tamil community.  
In sum, the evidence I found in my British case study research with regard to 
the alternative argument and its indicators suggests that by the end of the Sri Lankan 
war, policymakers placed the issue onto the British foreign policy agenda, that the 
diaspora mobilized, that it did effectively devise and promote frames to policymakers 
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that were relevant to and representative of the given political opportunity structure, 
and that the policy agenda subsequently embodied specific key messages and ideas 
present in the frames.  
 
4.4.2 Analysis of the Canada Case Study 
In analysing the Canadian case study, regarding whether I found evidence to suggest 
that host-country policymakers placed a diaspora’s home-country policy issue onto 
the host-country foreign policy agenda, my findings in this regard were that Canada’s 
foreign policy agenda did include the issue of the Sri Lankan war. The two main 
findings that demonstrate this are that Canada was involved in the 2002 peace process 
through the Forum of Federations and that Canada delayed naming the LTTE a 
terrorist organization until 2006.  
Findings in the Canadian case study regarding the voting bloc indicator for the 
electoral influence explanation suggest that the diaspora did represent a voting bloc 
that could pose an electoral threat. On one hand, many members of the Sri Lankan 
Tamil diaspora are newcomers to Canada and only Canadian citizens are entitled to 
vote. However, the community is incredibly immense, perhaps as large as 300,000 
people, and it is a very close-knit community which is highly concentrated in a few 
places in the country. Toronto is an area with one of the largest concentrations of Sri 
Lankan Tamils outside of Sri Lanka, and as such there are just a few federal 
constituencies to which Sri Lankan Tamils belong en masse. Tamils with Canadian 
citizenship would theoretically represent sizeable voting blocs within the individual 
ridings they are concentrated. It is true that they would only be largely represented in 
a few urban constituencies out of the 308 that the government would need to worry 
about the country over, but they could have posed a credible electoral threat in those 
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ridings. In particular, In January 2002, Bill Graham’s constituency was home to at 
least 6,000 eligible Tamil voters, when he was made Minister of Foreign Affairs 
(Cheran 2003, 10). It is plausible that Graham was concerned that his legacy and 
survival after the next election was tied up in his policy decisions and the approval of 
his electorate and that his policy decisions were at least somewhat influenced by this 
concern.  
Findings in the Canadian case study regarding the rallying voters indicator for 
the primary explanation suggest that the diaspora did not effectively rally voters to 
their cause. The evidence I found suggested that the Sri Lankan war or Tamil 
autonomy in Sri Lanka were never hot-button election issues in Canada. It is clear 
from the evidence that the Tamils were successful in garnering the attention of the 
media and of policymakers but the war in Sri Lanka became more of an issue that 
policymakers understood better and sympathized with than something the general 
public deeply cared about.  
The two main initiatives under taken by the government – involvement via the 
Forum of Federations in the 2002 peace process and delaying naming the LTTE a 
terrorist organization – were important but they were subtle. Had the public truly been 
concerned with the issue to the extent it would have been perceived by policymakers 
to affect the outcome of an election, I would have expected policymakers to have 
instead undertaken a more central or public role in helping achieve peace in Sri 
Lanka, such as intervening in Sri Lanka in 2002 directly rather than through a third 
party, or at least that they would have been more public about Canada’s initiatives in 
Sri Lanka.  
In regard to the indicator for the primary explanation on political campaign 
contributions, I found evidence to indicate that the diaspora did significantly 
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contribute to the political campaigns of at least one key policymaker. While I did not 
find direct data to indicate that Tamils contributed financially to campaigns, I did find 
evidence to suggest that during the 2003 Liberal leadership race, the Tamil 
community in Ontario elected 86 Liberal Party delegates supporting the leadership of 
the soon-to-become new Prime Minister Paul Martin from a total of 1434 Ontario 
delegates (Cheran 2003, 11). 
In sum, in reviewing my Canadian case study against the primary argument 
and its indicators I found that there is sufficient evidence to indicate that the policy 
issue regarding the Sri Lankan war was reflected in the government’s policy agenda, 
that the diaspora posed a credible threat with their voting power in at least one key 
riding, and that the diaspora contributed to the leadership campaign of Paul Martin 
and helped him become leader, and ultimately Prime Minister. However, with regard 
to the voter rallying indicator the evidence I found suggested that the diaspora did not 
successfully rally voters to the cause to make it a hot-button election issue.  
Regarding the alternative argument and the Canadian case study, I found that 
there is sufficient evidence of first indicator for the alternative argument. As 
mentioned above, I found evidence to suggest that Canadian policymakers placed the 
Sri Lankan Tamil diaspora’s policy issue of the Sri Lankan war onto Canada’s foreign 
policy agenda, as Canada was involved in the 2002 peace process through the Forum 
of Federations and it delayed naming the LTTE a terrorist organization until 2006. 
My findings in the Canadian case study regarding the indicator on 
mobilization for the alternative explanation of influence through framing suggest that 
the diaspora was very mobilized. Almost all of the 200,000-250,000 Tamils in Canada 
are close to one another spatially, as the vast majority of Tamils are concentrated in a 
few areas of Toronto. The community also has a large degree of social capital in the 
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many available Tamil communications within the community like newspapers and 
radio as well as Tamil services like music stores and cultural organizations. 
Furthermore, most of the Sri Lankan Tamils in Canada are recent refugees, and as a 
result many possess a shared personal history and recent first hand knowledge of the 
injustices perpetrated against Tamils in Sri Lanka. As the Tamil population in Canada 
grew and coalesced through the 1980s and 1990s, the community’s large amount of 
social capital acted as a mobilizing structure for the group, and its shared experiences 
as war refugees acted as a basis which marshalled and shaped its activity. I found that 
members of the diaspora acted as believable and convincing storytellers, motivated to 
bring attention to the issue of the Sri Lankan civil war to Canadians and the Canadian 
government and to compel them to get involved. They marched at protests demanding 
action and presented compelling narratives, repeatedly relaying to Canadians their 
accounts of the persecution and violence they and their family and friends faced back 
home. The multitude of frequent, well-attended, often enormous Tamil 
demonstrations since the mid-1990s to protest against the war right up until the end of 
the conflict demonstrates their mobilization. 
Evidence in the Canadian case study regarding the indicator on whether the 
diaspora devised and promoted frames on a policy issue to policymakers that were 
relevant to the given political opportunity structure suggests that in fact such frames 
were developed and advanced by the Sri Lankan Tamil diaspora in Canada to 
Canadian policymakers. The evidence I found indicates that in the communications 
from the different factions within the diaspora the Sri Lankan conflict was framed in 
terms of pointing the finger at the Sri Lankan government and of justifying the 
separatist Tamil struggle and even at times the LTTE, but they also continually and 
predominantly highlighted the conflict as an issue in need of attention and action from 
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the international community, and as something that Canada could relate to and assist 
with.  
While the over all tone and themes were consistent within the diaspora’s 
repertoire of frames, it presented different individual frames to utilize and expound to 
engage policymakers that also reflected the complex emotions possessed by the 
community on the conflict. In other words, the diagnostic frame the diaspora used 
portrayed the Sri Lankan government as the antagonist in the conflict, but as the 
protagonist, Canada as a member of the international community and a functioning 
federalist state sensitive to minority groups, was framed as a protagonist, although 
simultaneously, the LTTE as the freedom fighters for the Tamil people was often 
presented as a protagonist as well. The prognosis frame, which comprise the proposed 
solutions to the problem, was depicted quite straightforwardly as a peace process, but 
the motivational frame, which describes why action should be taken, relied on norms 
of humanitarianism and minority rights but it also played on ideas around vindicating 
the Tamils and the cause of the LTTE, and righting wrongs carried out by the Sri 
Lankan government against the Tamil population. The Tamil diaspora in Canada 
amplified these different elements of their frames to take advantage of the different 
viewpoints and world-views of their target adherents. In other words, the frames had 
what Fisher (1984) calls “narrative fidelity,” in that the ideas presented within them 
were fundamental to the personal experiences of the target adherents and they fit with 
their cultural ideologies. 
The multifaceted nature of the frames meant that explicit justifications that 
policymakers might have found appealing like the value in federalist solutions to 
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tensions and Canada’s experience with federalism were not always front and centre,20 
but the frames did align well with the overall political opportunity structure that was 
present in Canada at the time. They corresponded with the fact that Canada is a 
middle-power country with a history of peacemaking as well as of an openness 
towards refugees and multiculturalism, and the diaspora engaged with policymakers 
at a time that coincided with a national conversation that was being had on the value 
of federalist solutions with regard to Quebec.  
My findings in the Canadian case study regarding the indicator for the 
alternative explanation about mimicking the frames in the foreign policy agenda 
suggest that the policy agenda did mimic specific key messages and ideas that were 
present in the diaspora’s frames. Canada’s foreign policy agenda with regard to the 
war in Sri Lanka reflected the frames presented by the diaspora quite significantly, in 
terms of the complex issues the country was facing like Tamil nationalism, the 
complex relationship Canadian Sri Lankan Tamils had with the LTTE and the role for 
Canada to play in a peace process, especially during the time in the early 2000s when 
peace in the country was in some respects more feasible than perhaps ever before. 
This was demonstrated particularly in Canada’s role in the work of the Forum of 
Federations in Sri Lanka during the lead up to the 2002 peace agreement, in Canada’s 
decision to delay the naming of the LTTE a terrorist organization, as well as the 
continued engagement of policymakers with the Tamil community on the issue of the 
war after the LTTE was listed and the statements they made in the media on the issue.  
Even when the Conservatives were elected in 2006 and the new minority government 
placed the LTTE on Canada’s list of terrorists, the policy agenda in Canada on Sri 
Lanka still continued to be affected by the conflict and to be reflective to a large 
                                                 
20 For instance, I could only find one reference in which a member of the Tamil community compared 
the situation in Sri Lanka to Canada’s relationship with Quebec (see Levy 1995).  
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extent of the diaspora’s frames that urged Canada’s commitment to help end the 
conflict, as policymakers continued to engage publically on the issue.  
In sum, the evidence I found in my Canadian case study research with regard 
to the alternative argument and its indicators suggests that by the end of the Sri 
Lankan war, policymakers placed the issue onto the British foreign policy agenda, 
that the diaspora mobilized, that it did effectively devise and promote frames to 
policymakers that were relevant to and representative of the given political 
opportunity structure, and that the policy agenda subsequently embodied specific key 





In the first section of this final chapter, I review my findings that I concluded in the 
previous chapter and determine which explanation is more compelling. I then assess 
my confidence in this determination and my findings. After that I address key 
qualifications of this project and the contributions the thesis makes to the literature 
that relates to diasporas and their impact in foreign policymaking in their host states.  
 
5.1 Review of the Findings 
 
The purpose of this thesis was to investigate if, when and how a diaspora is 
likely to influence the foreign policy agenda of its host country toward its home 
country. To do so, I developed and tested a primary explanation and an alternative 
explanation against evidence in two case studies: the first case study surveyed 
Britain’s Sri Lankan Tamil diaspora and its role in influencing Britain’s foreign policy 
agenda with regard to the Sri Lankan civil war; the second case study surveyed 
Canada’s Sri Lankan Tamil diaspora and its role in influencing Canada’s foreign 
policy agenda with regard to the Sri Lankan civil war. The primary explanation I 
tested was that host country foreign policymakers (intervening variable) are likely to 
place a diaspora’s home country policy issue onto the host-country foreign policy 
agenda (dependent variable) as a result of a diaspora’s electoral influence 
(independent variable). The alternative explanation I tested was that host country 
foreign policymakers (intervening variable) are likely to place a diaspora’s home 
country policy issue onto the foreign policy agenda (dependent variable) if the 
diaspora effectively frames the issue in ways that engage and appeal to policymakers 
(independent variable).  
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The conclusion I reached after I tested the primary argument and its indictors 
against the evidence in the British case study was fourfold. First, I concluded that 
there is sufficient evidence to indicate that the policy issue regarding the Sri Lankan 
war was reflected in the government’s policy agenda. Second, I concluded that the 
British Sri Lankan Tamil diaspora likely represented a voting bloc that could 
potentially pose a credible electoral threat, but it also suggests that policymakers 
likely did not perceive it as a credible threat. Third, I concluded that the diaspora 
likely did not rally voters to the cause. Fourth, I concluded that it likely did not 
substantially contribute to the political campaigns of policymakers to influence the 
foreign policy agenda. 
My conclusion based on the results of my testing the indicators for the 
alternative explanation against the evidence in the British case study was also 
fourfold. I concluded that there is sufficient evidence to indicate that the policy issue 
regarding the Sri Lankan war was reflected in the government’s policy agenda, that 
the diaspora mobilized, that it devised and presented frames to policymakers that were 
relevant to and representative of the given political opportunity structure, and that the 
policy agenda subsequently embodied specific key messages and ideas present in the 
frames.  
Based on the evidence I found in my Canadian case study research with regard 
to the primary argument and its indicators I concluded that there is sufficient evidence 
to indicate that the policy issue of the diaspora regarding the Sri Lankan war was 
reflected in the governments policy agenda, that the diaspora posed a credible threat 
with its voting power in at least one key riding, and that the diaspora contributed to 
the leadership campaign of Paul Martin and helped him become leader, and ultimately 
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Prime Minister. However, I found that the evidence suggests that the diaspora did not 
rally voters to the cause.  
My conclusion based on the results of my testing the indicators about the 
Canadian case study with regard to the alternative explanation was that there is 
sufficient evidence to suggest that the policy issue of the diaspora regarding the Sri 
Lankan war was reflected in the governments policy agenda, that the Canadian Sri 
Lankan Tamil diaspora was mobilized, that it devised and presented frames to 
Canadian policymakers that were relevant to the given political opportunity structure, 
and that the policy agenda subsequently embodied specific key messages and ideas 
present in the frames.  
Assessing these four conclusions together indicates to me that the alternative 
argument, the effective framing explanation, is the more compelling explanation 
compared to the primary explanation of electoral influence.  
 
5.2 Assessment of my Confidence in the Findings, Qualifications and 
Contributions 
 
In this section I assess more in detail my findings and my conclusion that the effective 
framing explanation is the more compelling explanation. I begin by scrutinizing my 
conclusions about the British case study and then I scrutinize my conclusions about 
the Canadian case study. I then qualify my conclusions and discuss their 
contributions.  
With the British Tamil community’s inability to effectively mobilize as an 
engaged diaspora prior to the tail end of the war, during this time it was not able to 
effectively frame its home country policy issue effectively to policymakers. Britain’s 
policy agenda toward the conflict through most of the course of the war was, if 
anything, more sympathetic toward the Sri Lankan government and there is evidence 
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to suggest that the Sri Lankan government actively framed the issue in public fora 
around ideas that very much reflected Britain’s policy agenda, such as fighting 
domestic and international terrorism, which were concepts familiar to Britain in its 
dealings with the IRA and Al-Qaeda, and respect for the former colony’s sovereignty 
(see: Nadarajah and Sriskandarajah 2005). If the political and historical contexts in 
Britain were ones that were already independently inclined to view domestic 
nationalism through a terrorist lens and to support the independent sovereignty of its 
former colonies, it would be logical to deduce that the policy agenda would be 
reflective of them, if other frames were being presented by another actor like the Sri 
Lankan government that reinforced those perspectives, and if the Tamil diaspora was 
not well-mobilized to effectively challenge them. 
Towards the end of the war however, the direction of the British government’s 
policy agenda on the Sri Lankan conflict began to shift quite dramatically, as it began 
to pay more attention to the conflict, it sent an envoy to the UN to help with a peace 
process and it even declared in a report that it would support future autonomy 
initiatives of the Tamil people if they were inclusive and were reflective of 
democratic principles. As the Sri Lankan war began to garner more and more 
international attention and as the British government began to receive public criticism 
for its role in it for approving licences to export weapons to the government of Sri 
Lanka, the Sri Lankan Tamil diaspora regrouped with the help of new and emerging 
Tamil organizations and it presented new frames in dramatic visible ways that more 
inclusively appealed to the beliefs and experiences of members of the community and 
to policymakers around dominant western political principles of democracy and 
peace. The UK government was clearly embarrassed by the revelation of its arms 
exports to the Sri Lankan government, and it was moved to do something to portray 
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itself in line with norms of human rights and peace that as a western democratic 
country, Britain holds in esteem. When the diaspora presented frames about needing 
Britain’s help to quell the conflict in terms of principles of democracy and 
international humanitarianism and promoted specific plans of attack in this regard, it 
is likely that policymakers were receptive and the foreign policy agenda changed to 
reflect the frames.   
Representing a large population, the diaspora could have theoretically posed 
as a credible electoral threat which if interpreted as such may have influenced 
policymakers to become concerned about the issue and place it onto the foreign policy 
agenda. However, the reality of the circumstances and the way the diaspora presented 
the issue at the end of the war when the issue became part of the foreign policy 
agenda, were that the situation in Sri Lanka was urgent and it required immediate 
attention from members of the international community. Influencing the outcome of 
the next election was not the priority. It is possible that policymakers were concerned 
that their actions on the issue might determine the Sri Lankan Tamil vote, and that the 
war and Britain’s response to it might become a hot-button election issue in the 2010 
election for the public given the growing attention the Tamils were getting in the 
media. As a result it is possible that this in part can explain the actions of the British 
government on the Sri Lanka file in the last year leading up the end of the war, 
especially given that the government was embarrassed by the arms export revelations. 
It is possible that they were concerned that if they did not act to prove that they were 
not decisively in cahoots with the Sri Lankan government in the war the arms export 
licences revelation would become an issue, at least with the Sri Lankan Tamil 
electorate, given that the diaspora appeared to have become more mobilized than 
previously seen. Further research closer to the time of the 2010 election would be 
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necessary to better determine this and to see how much the issue came up in the 
election campaign.  
More persuasively, my findings suggest that the diaspora engaged in effective 
framing on the issue to policymakers that took advantage of the political opportunity 
structure. The evidence suggests that when the diaspora presented specific frames 
about the role Britain should and could play to stop the intensified violence in Sri 
Lanka around norms of human rights and democratic ideals, it is likely that 
policymakers were responsive and that accordingly the foreign policy agenda changed 
in reflection of those frames. As a result of this estimation, my conclusion with regard 
to the British case study is that this is the more compelling explanation.   
 In terms of my Canadian case study, I found a mobilized diaspora, a 
favourable political opportunity structure and a foreign policy agenda largely 
reflective of the frames presented by the Sri Lankan Tamil diaspora. Members of the 
Canadian diaspora shared similar backgrounds defined by experiences of violence, 
and of fleeing a conflict while having to, in many cases, leave family and friends to 
continue facing the war in their absence. While the feelings possessed by members of 
the diaspora toward the conflict in Sri Lanka were complex, I found that the diaspora 
possessed deep communal ties and connections as well as shared emotional 
attachments to the homeland and the goings-on there, which helped shape a strong 
and rather cohesive collective Tamil diasporic identity. In response to the increasing 
struggles faced by members’ friends and family back home in Sri Lanka, and to the 
increasing international dismissal of the LTTE and its battle against the Sri Lankan 
government and Tamil oppression as an example of terrorism rather than a legitimate 
struggle for liberty, this bond likely facilitated members of the diaspora in organizing 
and developing as a robust politically active diaspora. It framed the war as a conflict 
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that overwhelmingly impacted its civilian minority population, and that represented a 
deep-seated complex conflict between two distinctive groups within one state that 
gravely required an ultimate and peaceful resolution to which Canada could help 
make possible given its experience with federalism and its entrenched respect for 
minority rights. Addressing the complexities of the relationship between the Tamils 
and the Sri Lankan government and of Tamil nationalism, Canada supported the 
Forum of Federation’s involvement in Sri Lanka’s 2002 peace process, it delayed 
naming the LTTE a terrorist group, and it continued to pay attention to the conflict 
and call for action on the issue to the end of the war and beyond.  
 Some key aspects of the political opportunity structure were present that 
assisted the diaspora’s successes, such as a political environment defined by a 
prominence of policies and events relating to Canada’s federalist model and its 
experience with Quebec nationalism. These were key dynamics that influenced the 
diaspora’s frames and key Canadian policymakers were informed in this regard by the 
Tamil diaspora about the war and the issues facing the country. Policymakers saw 
opportunities in assisting via the Forum of Federation in the 2002 peace process and 
in delaying naming the LTTE. Reflecting Canada’s political culture of pluralism and 
its experience in dealing with nationalist issues from a federalist perspective, Canada 
likely carried out these initiatives because they cost them little political capital, and 
they addressed an important issue they were well informed about by the diaspora that 
the greater Tamil community was profoundly concerned about.  
The policymakers I interviewed straightforwardly understood the role of the 
diaspora in terms of informing Canada’s foreign policy agenda in this way.  For 
instance, when asked about his impression of the role of the diaspora in informing 
Canada’s foreign policy agenda on Sri Lanka, Bob Rae explained to me:  
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There is no doubt that [on the issue of the Sri Lankan civil war] the existence 
of a large and politically vocal Tamil diaspora played a role in both federal 
and provincial politics. The wave of refugees that came to Canada came with 
stories and experiences of hardship and discrimination, and that naturally 
affected Canadians' views about the conflict in Sri Lanka. (email 
correspondence with Rae 2010).  
 
In analysing my primary argument against the evidence in the Canadian case 
study, I did find evidence to suggest that the diaspora possibly posed a credible threat 
with their voting power in at least one key riding, and that members of the diaspora 
helped Paul Martin become leader, and ultimately Prime Minister. It is possible that 
policy discussions were had in part as a result of the calculated interests of 
policymakers, but the diaspora also clearly had developed relationships with 
policymakers throughout the duration of the war and this was a central factor that 
likely contributed to the issue being on the government’s policy agenda. As a result of 
these relationships, members of the diaspora were in an excellent position to inform 
policymakers about the issues in ways that reflected their opinionated views on the 
issue and to make a case for action on them. According to the impressions of both 
Bob Rae and David Cameron, despite pressure from Canada’s allies to do so, Canada 
refrained from listing the LTTE due to a combination of factors: discouragement 
coming from the Tamil diaspora in Canada, Foreign Affairs Minister Bill Graham’s 
sensitivity to the situation in Sri Lanka, and at the direct requests from both Norway 
and the Sri Lankan government leading up to the 2002 accord (email correspondence 
with Rae 2010, email correspondence with Cameron 2010). All things considered, my 
estimation with regard to the Canadian case study is that the effective framing 
explanation is the more compelling explanation.   
Given my assessments of the British and the Canadian case studies with regard 
to the two explanations, my overall conclusion is that of the two explanations 
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presented and tested in this project, the alternative explanation is the more compelling 
explanation.  
However, like all social science research, there are of course limits on the 
bounds of my project and the conclusions I reached. As I have concluded that the 
primary argument is not the most compelling in explaining how diasporas impact 
foreign policymaking in their host states, it would be important for future research to 
test the effective framing explanation in a crucial case study as the primary 
explanation to test it against another explanation and cases that are expected to be less 
favourable. Also, as common sense suggests, one should never place too much weight 
on the testing of just a couple of cases, no matter the findings. As a result, it would be 
academically prudent for future research to undertake the retesting of the same 
explanations in the same format with different cases to see if the findings hold. For 
instance, looking at other types of policy issues than a foreign civil war, such as a 
domestic issue that may garner more interest from the public, may yield different and 
interesting results. Also, it would be useful to replicate the study and see if the 
findings hold when examining cases in other institutional contexts than parliamentary 
systems where groups are also pervasive in the policymaking process, like the United 
States. Additionally, as mentioned, further research of the UK case closer to the time 
of the 2010 election in the UK would be useful to better understand if and how much 
the Sri Lankan war was a concern for the electorate, and if with this information, my 
finding in this study hold.  
In spite of the limitations of this project, the study undertaken and the findings 
gathered here make at least a couple of valuable contributions. I did not show that the 
primary explanation was the more compelling explanation, but that in itself is an 
important finding. It adds to the literature on policymaking and our broader 
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understanding of the role of electoral influence and framing and establishes good 
prospects for useful future research.   
Also, while much of the analysis undertaken to date on the subject of the 
diaspora has found that identity issues are often what define and motivate them, that 
diasporas are emotionally anchored to their homelands and can be extremely 
motivated to maintain and influence their homelands, the literature does not 
adequately delve into how diasporas as motivated by identity might become 
influential in the policymaking process, particularly with regard to the politics of their 
host states. While the literature implies that identity can explain the goals of the 
group, and the set of frames available to it, teasing these assumptions out 
methodically and testing them, which I undertook in this project, had not to my 
knowledge been embarked on previously.  
Perhaps more than anything else, this project brings to the forefront the 
importance of immigrants as actors in the domestic policymaking process. While 
diasporas have been studied extensively in many respects, few studies in any 
discipline have spent much capital on unpacking diasporas as political actors in host 
states and how they engage politically there to influence foreign policymaking. 
Today, people are moving throughout the world more than they ever have before in 
history. While immigration is certainly not a new phenomenon, globalization has 
increased the abilities and prevalence of transnational immigrant activism (Tarrow 
2006). As immigrants contribute more and more to the make up and character of 
nations, examining and better understanding how they affect politics within them is 
fundamental to a better understanding of domestic politics and ultimately 
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Tamil student. 2010. Interview by author by instant messaging. April. 
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Poopalapillai, David. National Spokesperson, Canadian Tamil Congress. 
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Tamil Immigrants 
Tamil refugee. 2010. Interview by author, Ottawa, Canada. August.  
Tamil refugee. 2010. Interview by author by instant messaging. April.  
Tamil refugee. 2010. Interview by author by instant messaging. July.  
Tamil refugee. 2010. Interview by author by instant messaging. July.  
 
Selection of Interview Questions for Policymakers 
Please describe your experience in dealing with the Tamil diaspora in 
Britain/Canada.  
What have they discussed with you?  
In your experience, how cohesive as a community were Tamils in 
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What role, if any, do you think that the Tamil diaspora in Britain/Canada has 
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what Britain/Canada should have been doing in Sri Lanka during the civil 
war?  
 
Selection of Interview Questions for Tamil Individuals 
When and why did you leave Sri Lanka?  
What has been your experience/how involved are you with the Tamil 
community in Britain/Canada? 
Do you think the Tamil community has lobbied the British/Canadian 
government on anything in particular regarding Sri Lanka? If so, how have 
they done this? 
How cohesive do you think the Tamil community in Britain/Canada is? 
How organized and mobilized do you think the Tamil community in 
Britain/Canada is? Can you please provide examples? 
How compelled do you feel toward Sri Lanka and working actively to improve 
the situation for Tamils there?  
